Crowdfunding, Everyone\u27s Doing It: Why & How North Carolina Should Too by Mathews, Kelly
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 94 | Number 1 Article 6
12-1-2015
Crowdfunding, Everyone's Doing It: Why & How
North Carolina Should Too
Kelly Mathews
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kelly Mathews, Crowdfunding, Everyone's Doing It: Why & How North Carolina Should Too, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 276 (2015).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol94/iss1/6
94 N.C. L. REV. 276 (2015) 
Crowdfunding, Everyone’s Doing It: Why and How North 
Carolina Should Too* 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 278 
I.  RAISING BUSINESS CAPITAL WITHOUT CROWDFUNDING .... 282 
II.  WHAT ABOUT CROWDFUNDING? ............................................. 287 
III.  THE FEDERAL JOBS ACT INTRODUCES EQUITY 
CROWDFUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES ............................... 289 
A. Overview of the Federal JOBS Act’s Crowdfunding 
Exemption .............................................................................. 290 
1. Aggregate Fundraising Limits and Accompanying 
Disclosures ....................................................................... 290 
2. Aggregate Annual Limits on Individual Investor 
Contributions ................................................................... 291 
3. Pre-Offering and Post-Offering Disclosure 
Requirements ................................................................... 291 
4. Target Offering Limits and Resale Restrictions .......... 292 
5. Rules Governing Intermediaries ................................... 292 
B. Lack of SEC Rules For JOBS Act Implementation ........... 293 
IV.  THE NORTH CAROLINA JOBS ACT .......................................... 294 
A. North Carolina House Bill 680’s Approach to Intrastate 
Crowdfunding ........................................................................ 294 
1. Aggregate Fundraising Limits and Accompanying 
Disclosures ....................................................................... 294 
2. Aggregate Annual Limits on Individual Investor 
Contributions ................................................................... 295 
3. Pre-Offering and Post-Offering Disclosure 
Requirements ................................................................... 295 
4. Target Offering Limits and Resale Restrictions .......... 296 
5. Rules Governing Intermediaries ................................... 296 
B. “We Can Do Better. Let’s Kill This Thing and Do 
Better.” .................................................................................... 297 
V.  THE CASE FOR EQUITY CROWDFUNDING IN NORTH 
CAROLINA ..................................................................................... 298 
A. Benefits of Equity Crowdfunding ........................................ 299 
B. Concerns Associated with Equity Crowdfunding ............... 301 
C. The Advantages of State Regulation of Crowdfunding ...... 305 
 
 * © 2015 Kelly Mathews. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 276 (2015) 
2015] EQUITY CROWDFUNDING IN N.C. 277 
VI.  “WE CAN DO BETTER”: A NEW AND IMPROVED 
PROPOSAL FOR INTRASTATE CROWDFUNDING IN NORTH 
CAROLINA ..................................................................................... 306 
A. Proposed Offering Limits and Disclosures Triggered 
by Certain Offering Amounts ............................................... 306 
B. Proposed Aggregate Annual Limits on Individual 
Investor Contributions .......................................................... 310 
C. The “All-or-Nothing” Provision .......................................... 315 
D. Proposed Pre-Offering and Post-Offering Disclosures 
and Reporting Requirements ................................................ 317 
1. Overburdening Small Issuers with Excessive Costs 
and Liability ..................................................................... 317 
2. Limits on Disclosure Value for “Unsophisticated” 
Investors ........................................................................... 320 
3. The Benefits of Standardized Disclosures .................... 324 
4. Required Disclosure of Limited Complex 
Information ...................................................................... 326 
E. Investor Education ................................................................ 330 
F. Intermediary Regulation ....................................................... 333 
G. Resale Restrictions ................................................................. 337 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 341 
 
94 N.C. L. REV. 276 (2015) 
278 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
INTRODUCTION** 
 
 ** Just days before this Comment went to print and after nearly three years of 
delays, the SEC approved final rules to implement crowdfunding. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 
269, and 274). These final rules will become effective 180 days after publication in the 
Federal Register. SEC Adopts Rules To Permit Crowdfunding, SEC (Oct. 30, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [http://perma.cc/UB2A-CLZ7].  
This Comment proceeds from the premise that North Carolina should use the 
intrastate exemption to the Jumpstart Our Business Start-Ups Act to take advantage of 
the economic benefits of crowdfunding, even in the absence of rules enabling 
crowdfunding on a national scale. Jumpstart Our Business Start-Ups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). Despite the recent passage of these rules, intrastate 
crowdfunding exemptions remain highly attractive financing alternatives for North 
Carolina’s entrepreneurs seeking to raise capital under a less burdensome regulatory 
regime. See J.D. Alois, Vote No: Commissioner Piwowar Dissents on Crowdfunding & Rule 
147 Rules, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2015, 1:43 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com
/2015/10/76576-vote-no-commissioner-piwowar-dissents-on-crowdfunding-rule-147-rules/ 
[http://perma.cc/2BC5-NC9M] (arguing that the SEC’s final rules “engender a complex 
web of provisions and need for additional compliance that will prove costly for smaller 
issuers”). 
For instance, state exemptions can attract issuers by providing for relaxed, 
streamlined rules, which impose fewer costs on issuers. For example, where the federal 
regulation requires audited financial statements for issuers seeking $500,000 or more, 
Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,412–13, the proposed state rule would not require 
audited financial statements unless an issuer sought to raise more than $1,000,000. See 
infra Section IV.A.1. States can also provide for less burdensome disclosure requirements. 
Compare Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,398–418 (requiring disclosure of the names of 
directors, officers, and substantial shareholders; the issuer’s business plan; the issuer’s 
financial condition; the purpose and use of the proceeds; the target offering amount; the 
offering price of shares or a valuation calculation; and a description of the issuer’s 
ownership and capital structure), with infra Section VI.D (describing a proposal to 
standardize disclosure and limit complex information to better fit the needs of investors 
and issuers). Further, North Carolina, like other states, may allow issuers to raise more 
money than that permitted under the federal rules. Compare Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 
at 71,391–95, with infra Section VI.A. Moreover, by passing a state exemption and 
allowing its entrepreneurs an alternate avenue to crowdfund capital, North Carolina can 
keep pace with the fourteen other states that offer their residents a more attractive 
crowdfunding regime than available under the federal rules. Compare infra Sections IV.B 
and V.A (describing North Carolina’s failure to pass a crowdfunding bill despite broad, 
bipartisan support and discussing the benefits that equity crowdfunding can bring to the 
state), with infra notes 98–111 and accompanying text (noting other state statutes 
authorizing intrastate crowdfunding). 
Finally, the intrastate exemption remains attractive from a public policy standpoint, 
as the states are better positioned both to regulate smaller, local projects and to serve as 
valuable experimental laboratories for the federal government. See infra Section V.C. 
With regards to the mechanics of crowdfunding, the states should be able to react more 
quickly than the SEC to implement necessary changes and streamline their crowdfunding 
regimes. Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 666 (2010) (explaining that the 
“SEC appears to be at the outer‐range of federal agencies both in terms of the extent to 
which it is dominated by lawyers and the extent to which its operation is paralyzed by 
bureaucracy.”); see also Mark Hatch, Opinion: SEC Bureaucracy is Threatening to Quash 
an Innovation Renaissance, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com
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In 1994, when Internet usage was growing astronomically,1 thirty-
year-old Jeff Bezos quit his Wall Street job to start an online retail 
company out of his garage.2 Bezos’ parents provided him with a large 
portion of their life savings—“a few hundred thousand dollars”—to 
launch his startup, despite what he described as a seventy percent 
chance of losing the entire investment.3 Within two months, Bezos’s 
sales were as high as $20,000 per week, which allowed him to acquire 
venture capital just one year later.4 Bezos’s startup has since become 
the world’s largest online retailer—Amazon.com—with annual 





Additionally, the SEC has proposed amendments to SEC Rule 147 to make intrastate 
crowdfunding more attractive to issuers. Currently, SEC Rule 147 creates a safe harbor for 
qualifying intrastate offerings under section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933. 17 
C.F.R. § 230.147(a) (2015). In addition to issuing final crowdfunding rules, the SEC also 
proposed an amendment to relax Rule 147 and to provide that the rule would no longer 
operate as a safe harbor for conducting a valid intrastate exemption under section 3(a)(11) 
of the Securities Act. See Exemptions To Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities 
Offerings, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,786, 69,799 (Nov. 10, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).  
Instead, the amended Rule 147 would operate as a separate exemption for intrastate 
crowdfunding offerings. Id. at 69,788. The rules would allow an issuer to make offers 
accessible to out-of-state residents and to be incorporated out of state, so long as sales are 
made only to in-state residents, the issuer’s principal place of business is in state, and the 
issuer satisfies at least one additional requirement that further demonstrates the in-state 
nature of the issuer’s business. Id. at 69,788–89. The proposed amendment would retain 
the eighty percent threshold for “doing business in-state.” Id. at 69,790–91. Additionally, 
the proposed amendment to Rule 147 would also allow state laws to permit issuers to raise 
up to $5 million in a twelve-month period. Id. at 69,791. Moreover, the proposed rule 
would relax the requirement that “offers and sales of securities . . . [are] made only to 
persons resident within the state or territory” in lieu of a less restrictive standard such that 
the issuer could satisfy the requirement “by establishing that the issuer had a reasonable 
belief that the purchaser of the securities in the offering was a resident of such state or 
territory[.]” Id. at 69,792–93. Finally, the proposed rule would amend the resale restriction 
to provide that “for a period of nine months from the date of the sale by the issuer of a 
security sold pursuant to this rule, any resale of such security by a purchaser shall be made 
only to persons within such state or territory . . . .” Id. at 69,794. This would open up the 
door for an intrastate secondary market, as described in Section VI.G of this Comment, 
and further, provide for the potential ability of secondary sales to out-of-state purchasers. 
See id. Thus, the proposed amendments to Rule 147 along with the SEC’s new 
crowdfunding regulations mean that intrastate crowdfunding in North Carolina not only 
remains a viable option but should be even more attractive than before. 
 1. Amazon Startup Story, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/learn/startup-stories
/amazon [http://perma.cc/23GL-3SBE]. In 1994, web-usage was growing at 2,300% per year. 
Id. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 276 (2015) 
280 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
riches” startup stories like Amazon’s tend to dominate the media,6 
they are rare exceptions. In fact, small businesses and startups are 
defined largely by struggles and failures, which mostly go 
unmentioned. Even in the land of opportunity, small businesses and 
startups often fail because capital is scarce and investors are risk 
averse. Like Bezos, entrepreneurs need startup capital—often large 
sums of it—to launch their businesses. But convincing investors to 
commit large sums of money to investments that pose a high risk of 
failure is extremely challenging. 
Equity crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to solicit many small, 
individual investments in exchange for equity securities without 
having to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”).7 Before Congress passed the “Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups” (“JOBS”) Act in 2012,8 equity crowdfunding was only an 
idea in the United States. While the SEC drags its feet, failing to 
promulgate rules to implement the equity crowdfunding exemption, 
several pioneering states have passed their own intrastate 
crowdfunding exemptions.9 North Carolina nearly became one such 
pioneer, but its equity crowdfunding exemption failed despite 
overwhelming bipartisan support.10 Many North Carolina legislators 
consider unacceptable the abandonment of efforts to bring equity 
crowdfunding to North Carolina.11 Indeed, North Carolina State Rep. 
 
 6. For example, many have heard the story of how in 1923, Missouri-born cartoonist 
Walt Disney moved to Los Angeles, California, where he spent months working out of his 
uncle’s garage to produce animated short films. See Jennie Cohen, Great American Garage 
Entrepreneurs, HISTORY (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.history.com/news/great-american-garage-
entrepreneurs [http://perma.cc/5CSF-HNCZ]. Disney’s small startup has since become the 
world’s largest media conglomerate—The Walt Disney Company. Id. Other “garage-to-
riches” companies include Apple, Inc., Hewlett Packard, Google, Mattel, and the Yankee 
Candle Company. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,428 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249) (“[T]he [crowdfunding] proposal would 
exempt securities sold pursuant to Section 4(a)(6) from the registration requirements of 
Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”). 
 8. Jumpstart Our Business Start-Ups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
[hereinafter JOBS Act] (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 9. See infra notes 98–111 (identifying fourteen states that have passed their own 
intrastate crowdfunding exemptions). 
 10. The original crowdfunding bill passed the North Carolina House by a vote of 103 
to 1. See House Bill 680, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts
/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BillID=H680 [http://perma.cc/3UMT-L5GP]; 
Intrastate Crowdfunding Is Officially Dead in North Carolina—for Now, N.C. JOBS ACT 
BLOG (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.jobsnc.blogspot.com/2014/08/intrastate-crowdfunding-
is-officially.html [http://perma.cc/2B73-UKHP]. 
 11. Rick Smith, Crowdfunding Killed in N.C.; Bill Backer Criticizes Senate Strategy, 
CROWDFUNDBEAT (Aug. 20, 2014), http://crowdfundbeat.com/2014/08/18/crowdfunding-
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W.A. Wilkins intimated that such efforts were just beginning: “We 
can do better. Let’s kill this thing and do better.”12 By failing to pass 
an equity crowdfunding exemption, North Carolina forgoes 
tremendous potential benefits—including economic growth, job 
growth, and renewed innovation—at minimal cost to taxpayers.13 
Thus, a North Carolina crowdfunding exemption deserves another 
attempt. 
This Comment argues that a successful crowdfunding exemption 
must strike a reasonable regulatory balance that both minimizes costs 
and burdens on small businesses and startups and protects investors 
from undue loss, fraud, and abuse. This balance would be 
appropriately achieved under a crowdfunding exemption that 
preserves many of the key provisions in the failed North Carolina bill, 
including: (1) prescribing reasonable target-offering limits and limits 
on the aggregate contributions of individual investors to curb 
potential investor losses, while still providing issuers with significant 
capital bases to support their startups; (2) requiring disclosures 
triggered by target-offering limits that reasonably enable investors to 
make fully informed investments, while minimizing burdens and costs 
for smaller issuers; and (3) retaining the failed North Carolina JOBS 
Act’s “all-or-nothing” provision,14 which prevents investor losses in 
undercapitalized companies while incentivizing issuers to be more 
responsive to investor concerns and to engage in more diligent 
planning. 
A prudent crowdfunding exemption could also improve upon the 
failed bill. First, this Comment proposes eliminating unnecessary or 
overly burdensome disclosures in lieu of simpler, standardized 
disclosures. Second, mandating investor education requirements will 
help investors to understand those disclosures. Third, promoting 
competition among intermediaries will not only incentivize them to 
offer issuers better services but will also encourage them to compete 
to feature the best companies on their websites and to adequately 
screen issuers to prevent fraud and reduce investor losses. Fourth, to 
further incentivize the screening of potential issuers, a crowdfunding 
exemption should require intermediaries to absorb some loss in the 
 
killed-in-nc-bill-backer-criticizes-senate-strategy/ [http://perma.cc/Q99G-ZH8B] (quoting 
Representative Wilkins). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Intrastate Crowdfunding Is Officially Dead in North Carolina—for Now, supra 
note 10. 
 14. An Act To Enact the Jump-Start Our Business Start-Ups Act and To Enact the 
New Markets Job Act of 2014, H.B. 680, sec. 2, § 78(a), 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(N.C. 2013) [hereinafter H.B. 680]; see infra Section VI.C. 
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event of fraud. Fifth, requiring intermediaries to maintain social 
networking features on their funding portals will facilitate 
communication between issuers and investors. Finally, loosening the 
resale restriction by vesting intermediaries with discretion to establish 
interportal, intrastate secondary markets for crowdfunded securities 
will provide for more accurate securities valuation and also provide 
investors with more adequate securities fraud remedies. 
This Comment proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses the 
inadequacy of current capital-raising mechanisms available to 
entrepreneurs. Part II introduces the various forms of crowdfunding 
available to issuers. Part III highlights several key provisions of the 
recently passed federal JOBS Act. Part IV discusses North Carolina’s 
attempt to implement its own intrastate equity crowdfunding 
exemption, House Bill 680, and the consequences of the bill’s failure. 
Part V argues that the benefits of an equity crowdfunding exemption 
outweigh the drawbacks, which can be addressed by appropriate 
regulation. Finally, Part VI proposes provisions for a new North 
Carolina JOBS Act with a focus on minimizing unnecessary costs and 
burdens on small businesses and startups while protecting investors 
from loss, fraud, and abuse. 
I.  RAISING BUSINESS CAPITAL WITHOUT CROWDFUNDING  
Because small businesses are the largest contributors to U.S. job 
growth, stimulating small businesses and promoting entrepreneurship 
is a logical formula for growing the American economy.15 
Unfortunately, small businesses tend to fail quickly,16 often due to 
capital shortages.17 Indeed, lack of access to capital is a major obstacle 
to starting a business.18 
 
 15. See Karen Gordon Mills & Brady McCarthy, The State of Small Business Lending: 
Credit Access During the Recovery and How Technology May Change the Game 3–4 
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-004, 2014), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty
/Publication%20Files/15-004_09b1bf8b-eb2a-4e63-9c4e-0374f770856f.pdf [http://perma.cc
/ES9U-MWWP] (explaining that small businesses employ “half of the private sector 
workforce” and create “two out of every three net new jobs” in the United States). 
 16. Small Business Advisory: Crowdfunding, NASAA (2013), http://www.nasaa.org
/13676/small-business-advisory-crowdfunding/ [http://perma.cc/D96X-64KW] (“[R]oughly 
50 percent of all small businesses fail within the first five years . . . .”). 
 17. Sara Hanks & Andrew Stephenson, Online Securities Offerings, 33 BANKING & 
FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., Feb. 2014, at 1, 1. 
 18. Howard E. Van Auken, Obstacles to Business Launch, 4 J. DEV. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 175, 180–81 (1999); see also Remarks on Signing the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 249 (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.gpo
.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200249/pdf/DCPD-201200249.pdf [http://perma.cc/B5Y7-7HDJ] 
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Startups and small businesses have few viable financing options. 
First, entrepreneurs can finance a business through credit card debt.19 
Small businesses that use credit cards to meet their financing needs 
probably hope that either their cash flows will sufficiently grow to 
service their credit-card balances, or that they will eventually be able 
to refinance the debt at a lower interest rate.20 Neither expectation 
takes into account the low success rate of small businesses,21 which 
means that the entrepreneur has a good chance of being personally 
liable for the debt. Moreover, credit cards are not a sustainable source 
of business capital because of relatively low credit limits22 that restrict 
a business’s potential growth.23 
As an alternative to credit cards, some fortunate entrepreneurs, 
like Bezos,24 can solicit friends and family for startup cash.25 This 
option is unrealistic for most entrepreneurs because it requires that 
the entrepreneur have family members who have the means and are 
willing to risk their investment on the entrepreneur’s ideas. 
 
(“[N]o matter how good [entrepreneurs’] ideas are, if [they] can’t get a loan from a bank 
or backing from investors, it’s almost impossible to get their businesses off the ground.”). 
 19. In a recent survey, credit cards were the preferred financing choice for small 
businesses, as thirty-seven percent of respondents indicated that they used credit cards to 
meet their financing needs, second only to revolving lines of credit from banks. NAT’L 
SMALL BUS. ASS’N, SMALL BUSINESS ACCESS TO CAPITAL SURVEY 4 (2012), http://www
.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Access-to-Capital-Survey.pdf [http://perma.cc/L58C-
9QGB]. 
 20. See, e.g., Karen E. Klein, Advice for a Business Haunted by Decade-Old Credit Card 
Debt, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-03-03
/advice-for-a-business-haunted-by-decade-old-credit-card-debt [http://perma.cc/F7NX-
9LFF]. For some, the risk has proven worth the gamble. Consider Kevin Plank, who 
started successful athletic apparel manufacturer Under Armour with a whopping $40,000 
in credit card debt and $20,000 of his own savings. See Mark Riddix, 6 Entrepreneurs Who 
Built Their Fortunes from Nothing, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www
.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0411/6-entrepreneurs-who-built-their-fortunes-from-
nothing.aspx [http://perma.cc/ZP37-3A7Y]. Since then, Plank has amassed a net worth of 
$500 million. Id. 
 21. See Small Business Advisory: Crowdfunding, supra note 16. 
 22. See, e.g., Credit Limits, CITIGROUP, https://www.citicards.com/cards/wv/html/cm
/know-the-rules/how-credit-cards-work/credit-limits.html [http://perma.cc/ZG83-UXZC] 
(explaining that creditors limit the credit available). 
 23. Credit card rates can be “as low as 11 percent or as high as 26 percent. The 
national average is currently 14.96 percent. For example, Wells Fargo’s Cash Back card 
offers a zero percent introductory rate to new customers. After 12 months, the variable 
Annual Percentage Rate, or APR, kicks in and your rate could climb to anywhere 
between 12.15 and 25.99 percent.” Zelkadis Evli, Why Are Credit Card Interest Rates So 
High?, YAHOO! FIN. (Oct. 11, 2013, 1:45 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/just-explain-
it/why-credit-card-interest-rates-high-132648813.html [http://perma.cc/CM9J-SH9K]. 
 24. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 25. For example, Sam Walton opened his first Wal-Mart store with $25,000, of which 
$20,000 was contributed by his father-in-law. See Riddix, supra note 20. 
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Moreover, borrowing from friends and family may invite unwanted 
meddling in the business, or worse, harm relationships with friends or 
family.26 
Most commonly, though, small businesses can apply for a bank 
loan or line of credit.27 Historically, small community banks have 
been the most frequent lenders to small businesses.28 But small 
business lending has declined steadily since 1998.29 The financial crisis 
of 2008, which caused widespread bank failures and consolidation,30 
aggravated the decline.31 Further, reactive legislation has subjected 
banks to more rigorous regulatory scrutiny, heightened capital 
requirements, and higher lending standards.32 The resulting 
regulatory environment and economic uncertainty have caused many 
banks to tighten their lending requirements.33 
Despite recent loosening of post-recession lending standards, 
access to credit for small businesses remains below pre-recession 
 
 26. Borrowing from Friends and Family, ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 16, 2006), http://www
.entrepreneur.com/article/24334 [http://perma.cc/DK54-FNMB] (citing START YOUR OWN 
BUSINESS: THE ONLY START-UP BOOK YOU’LL EVER NEED 183–88 (Riva Lesonsky ed., 
2d ed. 2001)). 
 27. NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASS’N, supra note 19, at 4 (showing revolving lines of credit 
and bank loans as the first and fourth most common forms of financing, respectively).  
 28. TANYA D. MARSH & JOSEPH W. NORMAN, AM. ENTER. INST., THE IMPACT OF 
DODD-FRANK ON COMMUNITY BANKS 12 (2013), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads
/2013/05/-the-impact-of-doddfrank-on-community-banks_164334553537.pdf [http://perma
.cc/9L43-7TAX] (“[One dollar] out of every $2 lent to small businesses comes from 
community banks.”).  
 29. A recent study indicated that nonfarm, nonresidential loans of less than $1 
million—“a common proxy for small business lending”—dropped from 51% to 29% since 
1998. Ann Marie Wiersch & Scott Shane, Why Small Business Lending Isn’t What It Used 
To Be, FED. RES. BANK CLEVELAND (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.clevelandfed
.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2013-economic-
commentaries/ec-201310-why-small-business-lending-isnt-what-it-used-to-be.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/T9EW-KBFH]. Reasons for this are numerous and include lower 
creditworthiness among small businesses, lower demand for small-business loans, and 
heightened lending standards resulting from stricter lending regulation. Id. 
 30. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 15, at 36. 
 31. See generally id. (describing both secular and cyclical trends causing reduced 
small-business lending). According to the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), from 
2008 to 2011, small business lending declined almost 18%; small commercial and industrial 
lending declined by 20%. REBEL A. COLE, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., HOW DID THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFECT SMALL BUSINESS LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES? 2 (2012), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/rs399tot.pdf [http://perma.cc/3J43-Y9TK]. 
 32. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 616, 124 Stat. 1376, 1615 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (2013)) 
(requiring capital requirements to be countercyclical); 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2013) 
(mandating annual and semi-annual stress tests by the Federal Reserve and the banks, 
respectively). 
 33. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 15, at 34–35 fig.24 (showing a decreasing 
average loan-to-deposit ratio since the recession). 
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levels.34 The decline in small business lending by commercial banks 
has forced entrepreneurs to look for alternative sources of capital, 
including venture capital (“VC”) funding,35 angel investors,36 and 
even public offerings of securities via initial public offerings 
(“IPO”).37 However, these sources of funding are peppered with 
inadequacies. They are available only to an extremely low percentage 
of small businesses and often require the entrepreneur to surrender 
some degree of control.38 For example, VC firms39 are highly 
selective,40 often focus their efforts on a small geographic area,41 and 
generally carry a higher cost of capital as compared to other avenues 
for financing.42 While a venture capitalist’s financial or business 
 
 34. See id. at 24–25 figs.13–14 (showing decreased small-business loan balances and a 
lower percentage of small business loans as a share of total loans since the recession). 
 35. Venture capital firms invest equity capital in “young, high-growth companies.” 
Venture Capital, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN, http://www.sba.gov/content/venture-capital 
[http://perma.cc/UEY9-GZF9]. VC firms “take higher risks in exchange for potential 
higher returns” on their investments, and they also participate in managing the businesses 
they invest in. Id. 
 36. Angel investors are generally “high net worth individuals who seek high returns 
through private investment in startup companies.” Id. They also seek involvement in the 
businesses that they invest in, which can be particularly helpful because angel investors 
tend to invest in industries that the angel investors are particularly familiar with. Id. 
 37. An IPO, perhaps the most implausible means of financing a startup, allows a 
company to access the capital markets to raise equity capital. See Michael S. Colo, IPO: Is 
It Appropriate?, POYNER SPRUILL, http://www.poynerspruill.com/publications/Pages
/IPOIsitAppropriate.aspx [http://perma.cc/V78F-M6M2]. 
 38. Attractive business startups that do manage to obtain VC funding are likely to 
give up some control because venture capitalists actively participate in the businesses they 
invest in. See Venture Capital, supra note 35. Likewise, angel investors are often former 
executives of large corporations, capable of providing superior advice to entrepreneurs. 
See, e.g., Tanya Prive, Angel Investors: How the Rich Invest, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2013, 9:27 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2013/03/12/angels-investors-how-the-rich-
invest/ [http://perma.cc/HFP5-NWE6]. 
 39. The majority of venture capital “comes from a group of wealthy investors, 
investment banks and other financial institutions that pool such investments or 
partnerships.” Venture Capital Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/v/venturecapital.asp [http://perma.cc/JU7Y-SG9L]. 
 40. See Dileep Rao, Why 99.5% of Entrepreneurs Should Stop Wasting Time Seeking 
Venture Capital, FORBES (July 22, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao
/2013/07/22/why-99-95-of-entrepreneurs-should-stop-wasting-time-seeking-venture-capital/ 
[http://perma.cc/MLT3-HD7U] (noting that, according to the Small Business 
Administration, only about 300 of the 600,000 businesses started each year receive venture 
capital funds). 
 41. See Linda Brewster Stearns & Mark S. Mizruchi, Banking and Financial Markets, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 284, 291 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard 
Swedberg eds., 2005) (“VC firms have traditionally invested in start-ups located within the 
same geographic region . . . .”). 
 42. VC expected rates of return were a whopping 50% to 70% during a firm’s startup 
stage, 40% to 60% during the “first stage,” 35% to 50% during the “second stage,” and 
25% to 35% during the bridge to an IPO. See Aswath Damodaran, Valuing Young, 
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expertise may be useful, many entrepreneurs are reluctant to 
surrender control or compromise on their original ideas, as VC firms 
often require.43 Additionally, wealthy individual investors, known as 
“angel investors,” may offer funding on terms not unlike those of VC 
firms.44 Finally, notwithstanding its excessive costs,45 an IPO is 
available exclusively to companies with consistently high growth.46 
Such potential sources of capital are often unsuitable or 
unavailable to most small businesses and startups. The persistent 
scarcity of adequate alternative capital-raising mechanisms continues 
to handicap American small businesses and startups, undercutting 
potential innovation, job creation, and the increased productivity 
associated with small businesses.47 
 
Startup, and Growth Companies: Estimation Issues and Valuation Challenges 15 tbl.2 (May 
2009), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/younggrowth.pdf [http://perma
.cc/69RC-VGFP]. Between July 1, 2011, and June 30, 2012, on the other hand, the average 
interest rates for variable and fixed-rate SBA loans were 5.3% and 5.8%, respectively. 
FITSMALLBUSINESS, GUIDE TO SBA LOAN INTEREST RATES 21 (Feb. 21, 2014), 
http://www.slideshare.net/FitSmallBusiness/guide-to-sba-loan-interest-rates [http://perma
.cc/DN3C-NSTT]. 
 43. See, e.g., 4 Common Venture Capital Myths, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/204198 [http://perma.cc/PE8H-7GB8] (explaining 
that VC firms assume substantial control, including veto rights on investments, 
acquisitions, and mergers). 
 44. See, e.g., Getting Started with Angel Investing, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www
.entrepreneur.com/article/52742 [http://perma.cc/2RZ7-7TP7]. Notably, angel-funded 
firms have a much greater chance of survival compared to other firms. See William R. 
Kerr, Josh Learner & Antoinette Schoar, The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance: A 
Regression Discontinuity Analysis 5 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-086, 2010), 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-086.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ3H-QDZX]. 
Because angel investors typically enjoy unique approval among other investors, angel-
funded firms are more likely to raise capital above and beyond that provided by the 
original angel investor. See id. 
 45. The substantial costs of an IPO, including paying lawyers, accountants, investment 
banking firms, and registering and reporting to the SEC, may exceed a firm’s entire 
offering target. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSIDERING GOING PUBLIC? THE 
COSTS OF GOING AND BEING PUBLIC MAY SURPRISE YOU 1 (2012), http://www.pwc.com
/en_us/us/transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf [http://perma.cc/A9KQ
-LEKW]. 
 46. Generally, IPO candidates are those that have had growing sales and net income 
for at least three to five years prior to the IPO. See Colo, supra note 37. Of course, most 
startups and young small businesses lack the requisite stability or operating history 
required for a successful IPO. See id. 
 47. See Yasser Killawi, Preserving an Entrepreneurial America: How Restrictive 
Immigration Policies Stifle the Creation and Growth of Startups and Small Businesses, 8 
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 129, 131 (2013). 
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II.  WHAT ABOUT CROWDFUNDING? 
Crowdfunding, a fusion of crowdsourcing and microlending,48 
provides startups and small companies with access to a much larger 
pool of investors than traditional forms of financing.49 Crowdfunding 
connects entrepreneurs with financiers of all levels of wealth and 
sophistication. In the crowdfunding model, many investors 
individually contribute a small amount of money to the business, 
limiting each investor’s risk and collectively allowing the business to 
meet its funding goal.50 
Sites like Kickstarter,51 Indiegogo,52 and GoFundMe53 have 
paved the way for crowdfunding to blossom into a viable financing 
tool in the United States. However, crowdfunding’s origins long 
predate the Internet. In 1885, publishing mogul Joseph Pulitzer used 
“the crowd” to pay for the Statue of Liberty’s pedestal.54 France 
offered America the Statue of Liberty so long as America provided 
the pedestal upon which the statue would rest.55 Through a 
newspaper, Pulitzer urged the American people to raise the money.56 
In just five months, 160,000 investors contributed $101,091 of the 
 
 48. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 27 (2012) (“Crowdfunding is a merger of two distinct antecedents: 
crowdsourcing and microfinance.”). In 2005, Kiva, a microlending portal, opened for 
business. See History, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/history#2005 [http://perma.cc
/3NGT-2923]. Kiva allows users to lend to entrepreneurs in poor, global communities who 
do not have access to traditional credit. See About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about 
[http://perma.cc/6G4H-PFR9]. Individuals can contribute as little as twenty-five dollars to 
an entrepreneur of their choice and receive interest payments in return. Id. For example, 
in 2014, Kiva funded a $100,000 loan to a manufacturer of eco-friendly beauty products, 
creating three hundred new jobs in Haiti. Kreyol Essence, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/lend
/722883 [http://perma.cc/4KZZ-7SU2]. As of October 2015, Kiva has loaned $762,769,675, 
funding 1,762,672 borrowers via 1,342,537 lenders. Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org
/about/stats [http://perma.cc/98H2-5MQW (dark archive)]. 
 49. See supra Part I. 
 50. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 27–29 (“Crowdfunding is just a combination of 
[crowdsourcing and micro-lending]—small contributions from a large number of people to 
fund small entrepreneurial ventures.”). 
 51. What Is Kickstarter?, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/hello?ref=footer 
[http://perma.cc/AR4M-A6G7] (providing a platform where “backers” can provide funds 
for startups in exchange for “rewards”).  
 52. How It Works, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/learn-how-to-raise-money-
for-a-campaign [http://perma.cc/9H6Z-6KX7]. 
 53. Common Questions, GOFUNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/questions/ [https://
perma.cc/R52R-W39L]. 
 54. The Statue of Liberty: A Pioneering Example of Crowdfunding, COTEC (Mar. 3, 2014), 
https://www.actbycotec.com/en/media.104/articles.168/the_statue_of_liberty_a_pioneering
_example_of_crowdfunding.a528.html [http://perma.cc/ZSG2-3EF3]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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$250,000 cost for Lady Liberty’s pedestal (approximately $6.3 million 
today).57 Seventy-five percent of the donations were under one 
dollar.58 
An early example of Internet crowdfunding occurred in 1997, 
when the British rock band Marillion raised $60,000 from its U.S. fan 
base to help finance its North American tour.59 Since then, four types 
of online crowdfunding have emerged: debt-based crowdfunding, 
donation-based crowdfunding, rewards-based crowdfunding, and 
equity crowdfunding.60 Debt-based, or “peer-to-peer” (“P2P”) 
crowdfunding emerged in the United States in 2006.61 P2P lending 
sites allow individuals to apply for unsecured loans, financed by 
individual investors who earn interest on each loan.62 In 2010, 
GoFundMe began offering donation-based crowdfunding, where 
users solicit donations for charitable causes or personal goals or 
needs.63 Rewards-based crowdfunding—perhaps the most popular of 
the varieties of crowdfunding—was first offered in 2008 by 
Indiegogo64 and then in 2009 by Kickstarter.65 Rewards-based 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Tim Masters, Marillion “Understood Where the Internet Was Going Early On”, 
BBC (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-23881382 [http://perma
.cc/QU8M-Z8G5] (“Inspired by [the fans who crowdfunded Marillion’s 1997 North 
American tour], the band turned the tables in 2001 and asked fans to pre-order an album 
12 months before release. Some 12,000 signed up to finance the recording, resulting in the 
album Anoraknophobia.”). 
 60. Types of Crowdfunding, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/crowdfunding101
/types-of-crowdfunding [http://perma.cc/ZC5P-SNB2]. 
 61. Judd Hollas, Is Crowdfunding Now a Threat to Traditional Finance?, CORP. FIN. 
REV., July–Aug. 2013, at 27, 30. 
 62. In October 2014, average interest rates as posted on Lending Club, the largest P2P 
lender in the world, ranged from 7.64% for prime loans, to 22.53% for riskier loans. 
Lending Club Statistics, LENDING CLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/info/demand-and-
credit-profile.action [http://perma.cc/Z4MQ-QXRL (dark archive)]. 
 63. Common Questions, supra note 53. For example, when Farrah Soudani was 
critically injured in the Aurora, Colorado, movie theater massacre in 2012, donations 
through the site reached $171,000 in just fifteen months to pay for her medical expenses. 
Help Farrah and Family—CO Theater Tragedy, GOFUNDME, http://www.gofundme.com
/Help-Farrah [http://perma.cc/5FKE-37H5]. 
 64. See About Us, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/about/our-story [http://perma
.cc/GL62-DVN5]. 
 65. See Pressroom, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/press [http://perma.cc
/P35W-6BUG]. One wildly successful campaign advertised the “Pebble Smartwatch,” 
which runs downloadable sports and fitness apps and connects to a smartphone. Pebble: E-
Paper Watch for iPhone and Android, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com
/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-for-iphone-and-android [http://perma.cc/UY2B
-HTBT]. The watch retailed at $150 but the campaign allowed backers to pre-order the 
watch for just $99. Id. The company sought $100,000, acquired 68,929 backers, and raised 
$10,266,845. Id. 
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crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to solicit contributions in 
exchange for future goods, experiences, or even a simple thank you.66 
Last, the newest form of crowdfunding, known as “equity 
crowdfunding,” allows individuals to invest in nonpublicly traded 
companies in exchange for equity securities.67 The SEC currently 
permits limited equity crowdfunding but only for accredited 
investors68 and a small number of unaccredited but sophisticated 
investors to participate in crowdfunded offerings.69 Prior to the 
passage of the federal JOBS Act,70 equity financing was not 
practically available to small businesses due to burdensome 
registration and compliance costs71 and restrictive securities laws.72 
But following passage of the federal JOBS Act, equity crowdfunding 
has the potential to be a game changer for startups and small 
businesses. 
III.  THE FEDERAL JOBS ACT INTRODUCES EQUITY 
CROWDFUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 
President Obama signed the federal JOBS Act on April 5, 2012,73 
to encourage entrepreneurship, increase small businesses’ access to 
capital, “ease the overwhelming regulations” that hinder small 
 
 66. See Chance Barnett, Crowdfunding Sites in 2014, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:11 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2014/08/29/crowdfunding-sites-in-2014/ 
[http://perma.cc/PB6G-C9R6 (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 67. What Is Equity Crowdfunding?, SYNDICATE ROOM, https://www.syndicateroom
.com/investors/what-is-equity-crowdfunding.aspx [http://perma.cc/S9QY-AVNY]. 
 68. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012) (directing 
the SEC to revise its rules in section 230.506 of title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
to permit solicitation of securities offerings so long as all purchasers are accredited 
investors). Accredited investors are generally persons or entities with high levels of 
financial sophistication or net worth, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2015), including any 
individual or married couple who has net worth of $1 million or greater (excluding the 
investor’s primary residence), or an individual that made $200,000 alone, or $300,000 with 
a spouse, in each of the previous two years. Id. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6). 
 69. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(b)(2) (permitting only thirty-five unaccredited investors 
but requiring that they or a representative be sufficiently sophisticated to evaluate the 
“merits and risks of the prospective investment”). 
 70. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 71. See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The 
Irony of “Going Private”, 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 151 (2006) (“Compliance costs required by 
the securities laws and by SOX have a large element of fixed costs that do not vary 
proportionately with firm size.”). 
 72. See Ross S. Weinstein, Note, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What To 
Expect When You’re Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427, 428 (2013). 
 73. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306. 
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businesses,74 and promote economic growth.75 The JOBS Act 
accomplishes these goals by amending the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 in several ways.76 Most importantly for this Comment, Title III 
of the JOBS Act, or the “Capital Raising Online While Deterring 
Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012,” 
(“CROWDFUND Act”) permits unaccredited investors to 
participate in online securities offerings.77 The following section 
highlights several key provisions of Title III, which still require SEC 
rulemaking for full implementation. 
A. Overview of the Federal JOBS Act’s Crowdfunding Exemption 
The SEC has yet to implement rules regarding several key 
provisions of Title III. Specifically, these provisions include: (1) 
aggregate offering limits and the accompanying disclosures triggered 
by certain offering limits; (2) aggregate annual limits on individual 
investor contributions; (3) pre- and post-offering disclosure 
requirements; (4) the “all-or-nothing” provision on equity 
crowdfunding issuers’ target offering amounts and the Act’s one-year 
prohibition of crowdfunded securities; and (5) rules governing 
intermediaries that feature issuers of crowdfunded securities. Each is 
discussed in more detail below. 
1.  Aggregate Fundraising Limits and Accompanying Disclosures 
Title III of the JOBS Act amends the Securities Act of 1933 to 
allow businesses, or securities “issuers,” to raise up to $1,000,000 in 
any twelve-month period.78 Issuers seeking $100,000 or less must 
 
 74. 157 CONG. REC. H9801 (2011) (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2011) (statement of Rep. Dold). 
 75. Congress acknowledged that “the future success of our economy rests in the hands 
of small, private business[.]” 158 CONG. REC. H1222 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of 
Rep. Sessions). Providing such small businesses with access to the capital they need will 
create “an economic environment that promotes growth and generates more revenue for 
the Federal government.” Id. 
 76. These amendments include (1) reducing the financial reporting obligations of 
smaller companies, see JOBS Act § 102, 126 Stat. at 308–10 (codified in various sections 
of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa, 78a–pp); (2) permitting general solicitation and advertising for 
certain securities offerings, see § 201, 126 Stat. at 313–15 (to be codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 77d); (3) providing for a potential exemption for private offerings under $50 
million, see § 401, 126 Stat. at 323–25 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77d, 
77r(b)(4)); and (4) relaxing the number of equity holders permitted before SEC 
registration is required. See §§ 501, 502, 602, 126 Stat. at 325–27 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78l(g), 78o(d)). 
 77. See § 302(a)(6)(B), 126 Stat. at 315 (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d) 
(permitting sale to any investor, though with limits on the amount to be invested by any 
individual investor). 
 78. § 302(a)(6)(A), 126 Stat. at 315. 
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provide filed tax returns for the previous calendar year in addition to 
financial statements certified by the “principal executive officer.”79 
Issuers seeking between $100,001 and $500,000 must provide financial 
statements reviewed by an independent public accountant.80 If 
seeking to raise more than $500,000, an issuer must provide audited 
financial statements.81 
2.  Aggregate Annual Limits on Individual Investor Contributions 
The FEDERAL JOBS Act limits the aggregate contributions of 
unaccredited investors. “Accredited investors” include financial 
institutions, high-net-worth individuals, sophisticated investors, and 
the directors of an issuer.82 The term “unaccredited investors,” 
therefore, includes everyone else, such as nonwealthy, 
unsophisticated, and individual retail investors.83 An individual 
investor with annual income or net worth less than $100,000 can 
contribute up to $2,000 or 5% of his or her annual income or net 
worth, whichever is greater.84 If the investor’s annual income or net 
worth is $100,000 or more, the investor’s aggregate investment is 
limited to 10% of the investor’s annual income or net worth, up to a 
maximum contribution of $100,000.85 The Federal JOBS Act does not 
place a cap on the contributions of accredited investors.86 
3.  Pre-Offering and Post-Offering Disclosure Requirements 
Issuers must file with the SEC and provide investors with 
extensive pre-offering disclosures that include: (1) background 
information regarding the issuer, its officers, directors, and each 
person holding more than twenty percent of the issuer’s shares; (2) 
information regarding the issuer’s ownership and capital structure; (3) 
information regarding the issuer’s business plan; (4) the issuer’s target 
offering amount, a deadline to reach the target, and the intended use 
of the proceeds; (5) the price of the securities or a method for 
calculating the price; (6) a description of the issuer’s financial 
condition and other recent offerings; (7) regular updates regarding 
the target offering amount and requisite deadline; and (8) requisite 
 
 79. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(i) (2013). 
 80. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(ii). 
 81. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(iii). 
 82. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2012). 
 83. See id. 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012). 
 85. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii). 
 86. See id. 
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information under future SEC rules, once they are issued.87 The issuer 
must also provide post-offering annual operational and financial 
reports subject to future SEC rule.88 
4.  Target Offering Limits and Resale Restrictions 
Offering proceeds will be released to the issuer once its target 
offering amount is reached, subject to additional SEC rulemaking.89 
Specifically, the SEC must make rules determining to what extent 
investors may cancel their commitments to invest.90 Investors cannot 
transfer or resell their crowdfunded securities for one year after the 
offering, subject to limited exceptions.91 
5.  Rules Governing Intermediaries 
Offerings will be made through intermediaries who will register 
with the SEC either as funding portals or broker-dealers.92 
Intermediaries must conduct background checks on issuers.93 The 
SEC will prescribe rules regarding additional disclosures, investor 
education materials and questions to be provided by intermediaries, 
as well as other matters the SEC may decide to require.94 
Although Congress provided a guiding framework by enacting 
these provisions, the SEC must also promulgate rules that fill in the 
gaps left open by Congress, as noted above. The next section explains 
the SEC’s delay in doing so, and discusses how states have acted to fill 
that void. 
 
 87. § 77d-1(b). 
 88. § 77d-1(b)(4). 
 89. § 77d-1(a)(7). 
 90. Id. 
 91. § 77d-1(e) (permitting transfer of such securities only back to the issuer, to an 
accredited investor, to a family member, or as part of a registered offering). 
 92. § 77d-1(a)(1). 
 93. § 77d-1(a)(5). 
 94. See § 77d-1(a)(3), (a)(4)(C)(iii). Under its proposed rules, the SEC would require 
intermediaries to “positively affirm” that investors review financial education materials 
that meet SEC standards, once established. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,471 
(Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249). At the 
same time, the SEC expressed the view that intermediaries should be empowered to 
design their own compliance programs, considering the intermediary’s business model, 
types of offerings, and “other relevant considerations.” Id. Thus, the SEC’s proposal 
empowers intermediaries to decide what education materials to provide, reasoning that 
“an intermediary’s familiarity with its business and likely investor base would make it best 
able to determine that format in which to present the [educational materials].” Id. 
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B. Lack of SEC Rules For JOBS Act Implementation 
While Congress has created the general framework for equity 
crowdfunding, several provisions in the JOBS Act still require SEC 
rulemaking for full implementation.95 Although Congress directed the 
SEC to issue rules to implement Title III of the JOBS Act within 270 
days of enactment,96 the January 5, 2013, deadline has long since 
passed. In the vacuum left by SEC inaction, states have taken the 
initiative by passing their own crowdfunding exemptions under 
section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, which exempts 
completely intrastate crowdfunding transactions from SEC 
regulation.97 As of this writing, fourteen states have passed intrastate 
crowdfunding exemptions, including Kansas,98 Georgia,99 
Wisconsin,100 Michigan,101 Alabama,102 Maine,103 Indiana,104 Idaho,105 
Colorado,106 Maryland,107 Tennessee,108 Washington,109 Texas,110 and 
Oregon.111 Unfortunately, while North Carolina was one of the first 
 
 95. See supra Section III.A. 
 96. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 302(b), 304(a)(2), 126 Stat. 306, 315–22 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 77c). 
 97. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012) (exempting 
intrastate offerings from SEC registration so long as the issuer is a business organized in 
the state where its securities are issued and all investors reside in that state). 
 98. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21 (2015). 
 99. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2.08 (West, Westlaw through July 31, 2015). 
 100. WIS. STAT. §§ 551.202(26), 551.205 (2015). 
 101. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.2202a (West, Westlaw through 2015 Mich. Pub. 
Acts 130). 
 102. ALA. CODE § 8-6-11 (West, Westlaw through Act 2015-520). 
 103. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304(6-A)(D) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 377 of 
the 2015 1st Reg. Sess.). 
 104. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.). 
 105. Idaho takes an approach unique from the traditional crowdfunding exemptions 
seen in other states. IDAHO CODE § 30-14-203 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. and 1st Extra. 
Sess.). The Director of the Department of Finance of Idaho reviews, approves, and issues 
orders on a case-by-case basis. Id. For an example of one of these orders, see Treasure 
Valley Angel Fund, LLC, No. 2012-7-02 (Idaho Dep’t of Finance Jan. 20, 2012), http://www
.finance.idaho.gov/securities/Actions/Administrative/2012/2012-7-02.pdf [http://perma.cc
/3YNV-4BZJ]. 
 106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-308 (LEXIS through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 70th Gen. 
Assemb.). 
 107. Maryland’s law only permits debt crowdfunding. MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 11-601 (LEXIS through ch. 475 of the 2015 Legis. Sess.) 
 108. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-103(b)(9)(C) (2012). 
 109. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 21.20.310, .320, .325 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Reg. Sess. & 1st, 2d & 3d Spec. Sess.). 
 110. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25 (West, Westlaw through 40 Tex. Reg. No. 5104, 
dated Sept. 18, 2015). 
 111. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59.035(15) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 848 of the 2015 
Reg. Sess.). 
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states to draft an intrastate equity crowdfunding exemption, the bill’s 
failure in the state legislature has kept North Carolina off that list.112 
IV.  THE NORTH CAROLINA JOBS ACT 
The North Carolina Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, or 
House Bill 680 (“H.B. 680”), was intended to a less restrictive version 
of the Federal JOBS Act. Compared with the federal exemption, 
H.B. 680 included higher offering limits, fixed (instead of variable) 
annual individual unaccredited investment limits, and less rigorous 
disclosure requirements. 
Section IV.A of this Comment addresses H.B. 680’s approach to 
each of the Federal JOBS Act provisions noted above. Section IV.B 
explains the reasons for and immediate effects of the bill’s failure. 
A. North Carolina House Bill 680’s Approach to Intrastate 
Crowdfunding 
House Bill 680’s approach to crowdfunding included (1) 
aggregate offering limits and accompanying disclosures triggered by 
offering limits; (2) aggregate annual limits on individual investor 
contributions; (3) issuer pre- and post-offering disclosure 
requirements; (4) target offering limits and the “all-or-nothing” 
provision; (5) the nine-month resale restriction on crowdfunded 
securities; and (6) limited rules governing intermediaries. Each of 
these provisions is discussed below. 
1.  Aggregate Fundraising Limits and Accompanying Disclosures 
The North Carolina JOBS Act would have permitted issuers to 
raise up to $1,000,000 within any twelve-month period without 
producing audited financial statements.113 In contrast, the federal 
exemption requires audited financials from issuers that seek to raise 
$500,000 or more114 and financial statements reviewed by an 
independent public accountant for those seeking financing greater 
than $100,000.115 Moreover, H.B. 680 provided issuers with an 
additional option not seen in the federal exemption—to raise up to 
$2,000,000 with audited financial statements.116 
 
 112. See supra note 10. 
 113. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(3)(a).  
 114. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(iii) (2013). 
 115. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(ii). 
 116. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(3)(b). 
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2.  Aggregate Annual Limits on Individual Investor Contributions 
Under H.B. 680, unaccredited investors’117 aggregate 
contributions would have been limited to $2,000 per issuer, per 
year.118 Accredited investors would not have been subject to any 
aggregate investment cap.119 By contrast, the federal exemption 
provides for a variable cap based on unaccredited investors’ annual 
income or net worth,120 rather than the fixed investment cap in H.B. 
680 that would have applied to all unaccredited investors, regardless 
of their income or net worth.121 
3.  Pre-Offering and Post-Offering Disclosure Requirements 
Although pre- and post-offering disclosure requirements under 
the federal exemption remain subject to SEC rulemaking,122 H.B. 680 
closely mirrored the requirements prescribed in the federal 
crowdfunding exemption. Under H.B. 680, issuers would have been 
required to produce a set of disclosures at least ten days prior to their 
securities offerings.123 Required disclosures included: (1) background 
information about the underwriter, the company, its executive 
officers, and any shareholders with at least ten percent ownership in 
the company’s securities; (2) the company’s business plan; (3) the 
issuer’s target offering amount, a deadline to reach that target, and a 
statement describing the intended use of the offering proceeds; (4) 
information regarding the issuer’s capital structure; (5) information 
regarding the terms and potential modifications to securities, the 
differences among classes of securities, and the total percentage 
ownership of the company that the offered securities represent; (6) a 
discussion of significant factors that make a particular offering risky; 
(7) a description of any litigation or legal proceedings involving the 
company or its management; and (8) the websites that would be used 
in connection with the offering.124 
House Bill 680 would have required issuers to display on the 
cover page of their disclosure documents a legend that alerted 
investors awareness to the risks associated with crowdfunded 
 
 117. H.B. 680 borrows the SEC’s definition of “accredited investor.” Compare id. sec. 
2, § 78A-17.1(a)(4), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2012) (defining “accredited investor”). 
 118. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(4). 
 119. Id. 
 120. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
 121. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(4). 
 122. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 123. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5). 
 124. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(b). 
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securities.125 Additionally, the bill would have required investors to 
certify in writing that they understood the financial risks of investing 
in crowdfunded securities.126 Subsequent to the offering, H.B. 680 
would have required issuers to provide to investors quarterly financial 
and operational reports.127 
4.  Target Offering Limits and Resale Restrictions 
Under H.B. 680, offering proceeds would have been collected 
and deposited in escrow in a North Carolina bank.128 The proceeds 
would have been released to the issuer only once the aggregate 
capital raised from all investors met the issuer’s offering target.129 
Under the “all-or-nothing” rule, similar to that provided in the 
federal exemption,130 if the issuer failed to reach its offering target by 
the deadline stated in the pre-offering disclosures, investors would 
have been free to cancel their commitments.131 Post-offering, H.B. 680 
would have temporarily prohibited investors from reselling or 
transferring securities, subject to limited exceptions.132 
5.  Rules Governing Intermediaries 
Additionally, under H.B. 680, intermediaries would have been 
required to obtain evidence from an issuer that the issuer was 
incorporated and “authorized to do business” in North Carolina.133 
Intermediaries would also have been prohibited from certain 
activities that may create conflicts of interest.134 Specifically, 
intermediaries would have been prohibited from offering investment 
advice or recommendations, advertising particular securities, 
compensating or furnishing commissions based on sales of certain 
securities on the intermediary’s website, and holding, investing, or 
handling investors’ funds or securities.135 The federal exemption 
 
 125. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7) (including warnings about liquidity risk, the potential 
inaccuracy of disclosure documents, and the investor’s burden to examine the issuer and 
terms of the offering). 
 126. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(8). 
 127. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(c). 
 128. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(c). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See supra Section III.A.4. 
 131. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(c). 
 132. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7). 
 133. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(9)(a). 
 134. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(11)-(12). 
 135. Id. 
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provides similar requirements, though the SEC may impose 
additional requirements via rulemaking.136 
B. “We Can Do Better. Let’s Kill This Thing and Do Better.”137 
House Bill 680 passed the North Carolina House of 
Representatives with near unanimous support.138 The bill was then 
approved by the senate commerce committee,139 before it stalled as 
part of a complicated legislative power play between the state house, 
senate, and Governor McCrory.140 Rather than passing the 
crowdfunding exception on its own, the senate attached the language 
of H.B. 680 to a bill that would have enacted several controversial 
economic development incentives and budget initiatives that were 
deeply unpopular in the house, but supported by the governor.141 In a 
“legislative insurrection” against the senate, governor, and house 
leadership, H.B. 1224 was narrowly defeated, taking the popular 
crowdfunding exemption with it.142 Thus, if the votes on H.B. 680 
were at all predictive, the crowdfunding exemption was politically 
popular and would have easily passed had it not been embroiled in 
the showdown between the house, senate, and governor.143 However, 
there may still be room for improvement. In the wake of the 
crowdfunding exemption’s defeat, one state legislator simply said: 
“We can do better. Let’s kill this thing and do better.”144 
The state suffered tangible consequences as a result of the bill’s 
failure, as North Carolina’s small businesses and startups were denied 
 
 136. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2013). 
 137. Smith, supra note 11. 
 138. See supra note 10. 
 139. See, e.g., Samantha Hurst, North Carolina’s Senate Commerce Committee 
Approves Equity Crowdfunding Bill, CROWDFUND INSIDER (July 18, 2014, 7:23 AM), 
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/07/44473-north-carolinas-senate-approves-equity-
crowdfunding-bill/ [http://perma.cc/V3XH-U25T]; David Rani, Crowdfunding Bill Endorsed 
by Senate Committee, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 16, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com
/news/business/article10026410.html [http://perma.cc/8KYX-ZZHB]. 
 140. Laura Leslie, House Defeats Senate Gambit on TAs, Incentives, WRAL (Aug. 20, 
2014), http://www.wral.com/house-defeats-senate-gambit-on-tas-incentives/13906612/ 
[http://perma.cc/398U-72L8]. 
 141. H.B. 1224, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); Mark Binker, Senate Wants 
To Tie Teaching Assistant Money to Economic Development Bill, WRAL (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.wral.com/senate-wants-to-tie-teaching-assistant-money-to-economic-
development-bill/13894547/ [http://perma.cc/JA4R-ZJTK]. 
 142. Leslie, supra note 140. 
 143. Intrastate Crowdfunding Is Officially Dead in North Carolina—For Now, supra 
note 10. 
 144. Smith, supra note 11. 
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the tremendous potential benefits of equity crowdfunding.145 Some 
small businesses that were counting on crowdfunding immediately 
relocated to new states where crowdfunding exemptions had already 
passed.146 Likewise, states that already have crowdfunding exemptions 
have produced several notable business successes.147 
V.  THE CASE FOR EQUITY CROWDFUNDING IN NORTH CAROLINA 
The General Assembly should bring equity crowdfunding to 
North Carolina under a new and improved crowdfunding exemption. 
North Carolina forgoes tremendous benefits associated with equity 
crowdfunding while also suffering from a competitive disadvantage 
compared to other states where exemptions have been passed. 
Allowing North Carolinian entrepreneurs to draw on equity 
crowdfunding can help grow the state’s economy by encouraging 
entrepreneurship—thus improving on already innovative ideas; 
entrepreneurs’ access to the capital they desperately need; and 
increasing investor opportunities, returns, and diversification. 
At the same time, there are also concerns associated with equity 
crowdfunding that have challenged its development. Those concerns 
include the high risks associated with startups, the high rate of small 
business failure, and potential abuse by fraudsters. On balance, the 
benefits of equity crowdfunding outweigh the concerns, which 
 
 145. See, e.g., Lauren K. Ohnesorge, Groundfloor Leaves Raleigh for Atlanta, Cites 
“Progressive Stance”, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Aug. 19, 2014, 11:21 AM), http://www.bizjournals
.com/triangle/news/2014/08/19/groundfloor-leaves-raleigh-for-atlanta-cites.html [http://perma
.cc/TVZ2-QHA6 (staff-uploaded archive)]; see also Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, 
‘CrowdFunding’ Gets a State-Level Test Run, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2013, 7:46 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303722104579237862928397316 [http://perma
.cc/92P8-ZTGH (staff-uploaded archive)] (reporting on the first small companies to take 
advantage of Georgia’s crowdfunding exemption). 
 146. For example, Groundfloor, a Raleigh-based real estate investment startup, moved 
to Atlanta, Georgia, where equity crowdfunding was already legal. Ohnesorge, supra note 
145. Notably, Groundfloor explained that the primary reason for the move was that 
Georgia was “arguably the most forward-thinking state on issues related to 
crowdfunding[.]” Id. 
 147. Bohemian Guitars, which sells oilcan guitars starting at $250, used the Georgia 
exemption to raise $126,000, enough to manufacture 1,000 guitars. See Simon & Loten, 
supra note 145. More recently, Tecumseh Brewing used Michigan’s intrastate exemption 
to raise $175,000. Stateside Staff, Tecumseh Brewing Is MILE’s First Crowdfunding 
Success, MICH. RADIO (May 15, 2014), http://michiganradio.org/post/tecumseh-brewing-
company-miles-first-crowdfunding-success [http://perma.cc/68HJ-5779]. Construction and 
rehabilitation financing have “had some success raising funds for real-estate projects, 
especially . . . in deals where a bank loan would be difficult or not well-suited to the deal.” 
Nicole Fallon, Crowdfunding Goes Mainstream: Trends and Tips for 2015, BUS. NEWS 
DAILY (Nov. 25, 2014, 10:06 AM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/7506-crowdfunding-
trends-tips.html [http://perma.cc/P4BL-SDZX]. 
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appropriate legislation can mitigate. Ultimately, states are best 
positioned to regulate crowdfunding by legislating to capture its 
benefits and to mitigate its risks. 
A. Benefits of Equity Crowdfunding 
Currently, there are at least two barriers to entrepreneurs’ access 
to business capital. First, entrepreneurs cannot access investor funds if 
they cannot connect with investors.148 This barrier is often the cause 
of the geographic concentration of business capital in certain areas, 
like Silicon Valley.149 Notably, the majority of startup capital is raised 
within fifty miles of the startup firm’s location.150 The Internet can 
help ameliorate this disconnect. Online equity crowdfunding portals 
allow investors to remotely search, identify, and evaluate investment 
opportunities.151 The Internet’s ability to connect financiers and 
entrepreneurs is already evinced by other varieties of 
crowdfunding.152 
Second, private small business investment is generally limited to 
wealthy, “sophisticated” individuals, or firms that specialize in startup 
firm investments.153 However, crowdfunding expands the investor 
base by providing entrepreneurs a fresh, untapped, and abundant 
source of capital.154 Equity crowdfunding will allow “unaccredited” 
investors155—everyday people—to begin to invest in small businesses 
and startup companies.156 Thus, unlike companies funded by angel 
investors or venture capital, projects funded by equity crowdfunding 
reach their target offering goals by soliciting small contributions from 
a large number of investors.157 Furthermore, crowdfunding empowers 
people to wed their passions and interests to a financial return, which 
already takes place with existing forms of crowdfunding.158 Investors 
 
 148. See supra notes 34–47 and accompanying text. 
 149. Bradford, supra note 48, at 101; see also Stearns & Mizruchi, supra note 41, at 291. 
 150. See Thomas E. Vass, North Carolina’s New Nexus of Innovation: Where Local 





 151. See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 35–47 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 155. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2012) (defining “accredited investor”). 
 156. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 157. See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text. 
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uninterested in traditional purposes for investing may find such an 
option particularly attractive.159 
While equity crowdfunding expands the investor base, it also 
expands the entrepreneurial base. Lack of access to capital poses a 
substantial obstacle to small business startups.160 After investing the 
time and effort necessary to bring its ideas to fruition, a would-be 
startup faces the bona fide risk that a capital shortfall could stonewall 
its project.161 Facing that risk leaves many would-be entrepreneurs 
with cold feet.162 Equity crowdfunding may encourage 
entrepreneurship and increase innovation by reducing capital risks.163 
Furthermore, crowdfunding portals will facilitate open 
communication among investors, potential customers, and 
entrepreneurs, allowing these three groups to align their interests.164 
Investors can air their concerns by providing specific 
recommendations to issuers. Issuers will benefit from customer and 
investor feedback before spending substantial sums on production, 
allowing issuers to perfect their products and proactively respond to 
 
 159. See, e.g., Why Invest, SEC, http://investor.gov/introduction-markets/why-invest
#.VJbmmsAAA [http://perma.cc/PHJ9-WDKR] (explaining that people generally invest to 
attain financial security or grow their wealth). 
 160. See supra Part I. 
 161. See, e.g., Quitting My Corporate Job for My Dream Startup Ruined My Life, 
BANKS.COM (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.banks.com/articles/quitting-my-corporate-job-my-
dream-startup-ruined-my-life [http://perma.cc/LGN2-XRXK] (“I was running out of funds 
for the entire project at a much quicker rate than I had predicted. There were so many 
unexpected costs in the startup process that I hadn’t accounted for being new to the realm 
of starting my own business.”); Taylor Sloper, Too Scared To Leave Your 9-to-5? Code 
Fellows’ Brent Turner Debunks Silly Startup Myths, GEEKWIRE (Oct. 22, 2013, 4:37 PM), 
http://www.geekwire.com/2013/codefellows-ceo-brent-turner/ [http://perma.cc/WBW8-8WH2] 
(“There’s no question that joining or founding a startup involves more risk financially than 
taking a secure corporate job.”). 
 162. See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 313:4 n.4, 
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2015) (noting that the “climate of entrepreneurship” 
includes “perceptions of prospective entrepreneurs regarding the availability of 
opportunities . . . their ability to start businesses and . . . the availability of support from 
others”); Mark Williams, Fear of Failure Blamed for Central Ohio’s Lack of Business 
Startups, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 18, 2013, 1:37 AM), http://www.dispatch.com
/content/stories/business/2014/09/18/fear-is-one-reason-area-hasnt-grown-businesses.html 
[http://perma.cc/T3AF-R48M] (attributing fear of failure and fundraising struggles to 
startup hesitancy). 
 163. See, e.g., NADINE SCHOLZ, THE RELEVANCE OF CROWDFUNDING: THE IMPACT 
ON THE INNOVATION PROCESS OF SMALL ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS 61 (2015) 
(“Crowdfunding reduces this risk because it ‘is helpful in validating the market demand 
and idea concept; a normal new venture does not have this possibility to show this 
demand.’ ” (internal ellipses omitted)). 
 164. Intermediaries are required by the SEC’s proposal to provide communication 
channels on their funding portals. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,557 (Nov. 5, 
2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249). 
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customer needs before they enter the market.165 Accordingly, 
crowdfunding allows “[n]ew ideas [to] be free market tested earlier in 
their development cycle and discarded or funded at a faster rate.”166 
Thanks to the unique risks associated with small startup 
companies, crowdfunded securities should provide higher risk 
premiums, potentially resulting in higher returns to investors.167 
Before crowdfunding was possible, investments in small or startup 
companies were generally available only to wealthy individuals and 
institutional investors.168 New opportunities provided by 
crowdfunding will allow unsophisticated investors to better diversify 
their investment portfolios.169 
B. Concerns Associated with Equity Crowdfunding 
There are also several concerns associated with permitting small 
businesses and startups to solicit equity capital from nontraditional 
and “unsophisticated” investors.170 The preceding discussion 
illustrates one of the primary drawbacks to crowdfunded securities—
the risk of loss, which is “inherent in small business startups.”171 
However, the only way to completely eliminate the risk would be to 
“bar small business financing altogether.”172 Alternatively, the 
aggregate individual investment limits found in the federal and state 
 
 165. See Howard Greenstein, Tool To Predict Tech Startup Success, INC. (Aug. 29, 2011), 
http://www.inc.com/howard-greenstein/tool-to-predict-tech-startup-success.html [http://perma
.cc/DDT7-NH5L (dark archive)] (discussing a recent study that found many startups failed 
because they focused more on their product than their potential customers and would 
benefit from incorporating customer feedback in the design of product prototypes). 
 166. Howard Leonhardt, The Enormous Implications of Crowdfunding, CROWDFUNDBEAT, 
http://crowdfundbeat.com/2014/10/13/the-enormous-implications-of-crowdfunding/ 
[http://perma.cc/9MUP-YGHD]. 
 167. A security’s risk premium “is a form of compensation for investors who tolerate 
the extra risk—compared to that of a risk-free asset—in a given investment.” Risk 
Premium Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/riskpremium
.asp [http://perma.cc/TW77-AXRX]. 
 168. See supra notes 34–46, 68 and accompanying text. 
 169. Ryan Caldbeck, How Crowdfunding Can Boost Your Investment Diversity, 
FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/2013/12/19
/how-crowdfunding-can-boost-your-investment-diversit/ [http://perma.cc/37CE-MFXG]. 
 170. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,517, 66,519 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249) (referring to the risks faced by 
“unsophisticated investors”); Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding’s Curious 
Conundrum, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 373, 374 (2012) (noting the SEC’s 
“view that there is no way unsophisticated investors can apply a DCF/CAPM analysis . . . .”); 
Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 461 (2003) (suggesting disclosures may be 
tailored to “unsophisticated” investors). 
 171. Bradford, supra note 48, at 99; see supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 172. Bradford, supra note 48, at 99. 
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JOBS acts strike a balance by making losses to any single investor 
“relatively small and bearable.”173 Moreover, the risks inherent in 
equity crowdfunding are comparable to other types of crowdfunding, 
to which “the public is already contributing billions of dollars.”174 And 
those types of crowdfunding do not necessarily offer returns to 
investors to compensate for risk.175 
Equity crowdfunding may not offer issuers the support and 
business expertise provided by VC funds and angel investors.176 
However, the “crowd,” which includes investors, and perhaps even 
potential customers and experts, will supply additional, qualitative 
insight to issuers through communication portals on intermediaries’ 
websites.177 Crowdfunding portals may also choose to employ their 
own experts to assist issuers, similar to crowdfunding offerings seen 
elsewhere.178 
Like any arrangement where people provide funds to an 
unfamiliar person, crowdfunding opens the door to fraud. Fraudulent 
issuers may raise money to pay themselves, family, or friends out of 
investors’ pockets under the guise of a legitimate business.179 Issuers 
may attempt to dupe “unsophisticated” investors by promising 
“unrealistic returns on investment.”180 The reduced transparency 
inherent in crowdfunding increases the likelihood of fraud, where 
investors “are likely to be strangers to the company, and, as such, 
would have no information about the company except that provided 
by the company or website where the securities are offered for 
sale.”181 These concerns can be mitigated by, among other things, 
providing for more useful, comprehensible, standardized disclosures 
supplemented with investor education requirements, and by 
incentivizing intermediaries to vigorously screen issuers. These 
proposals will be discussed in greater detail in Part VI. 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.; see also supra Part II. 
 175. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
 177. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 427–30. 
 178. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 192–97. 
 179. Lyndon M. Tretter, Crowdfunding: Small-Business Incubator or Securities Fraud 
Accelerator?, 18 WESTLAW J. SEC. LITIG. & REG., Aug. 21, 2012, at *1, *1, 18 No. 8 
WJSLR; see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks 
and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on 
Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1767 (2012) (explaining that “fraudsters 
have for nearly a century found ways to adapt their schemes to new technologies” using 
methods such as boiler-room tactics, pump-and-dump operations, and Ponzi schemes). 
 180. Tretter, supra note 179, at *2; see also Hazen, supra note 179, at 1766–67 & n.192. 
 181. Hazen, supra note 179, at 1766. 
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Given that online equity crowdfunding is brand new, its practical 
implications are unclear. Variations of equity crowdfunding platforms 
exist outside the United States, but most face the same uncertainty 
that seems to plague the industry in general.182 The United 
Kingdom,183 Germany,184 Italy,185 and France,186 among other 
countries, have already established their own variations of 
crowdfunding, but often with informal or unclear guidance and 
shoddy enforcement.187 Several questions remain unanswered. Will 
equity crowdfunding effectively improve access to business capital? 
Which regulatory schemes are effective? Is fraud pervasive, and if so, 
what regulatory measures are available to effectively combat fraud? 
For over ten years, companies have been able to offer liquid 
equity securities under established securities laws in Australia.188 The 
Australian Small Scale Offering Board (“ASSOB”) is the best, and 
 
 182. See generally Weinstein, supra note 72, at 437–49 (2013) (describing variations on 
crowdfunding outside the United States and the challenges faced by investors, issuers, 
intermediaries, and regulators). 
 183. The United Kingdom simply applies current securities regulations to the equity 
crowdfunding industry, without prescribing additional rules exclusive to equity 
crowdfunding. See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, §§ 85(1), 86(1)(b) (U.K.) 
(exempting from registration those securities offered to fewer than 150 persons). The U.K. 
crowdfunding space currently consists of two funding portals. Weinstein, supra note 72, at 
437. To participate, investors are required to undergo a rigorous certification process. Id. 
at 439. 
 184. Crowdfunding in Germany essentially operates similarly as it does throughout 
Europe—without any real regulatory “approval or disapproval.” Weinstein, supra note 72, 
at 447. For example, crowdfunding in Germany operated on an assumption that offerings 
were limited to €100,000 until the crowdfunding platform Seedmatch challenged this limit 
in 2012. Id. German regulators acquiesced, and now crowdfunding campaigns may exceed 
the limit. Id. Subsequently, German authorities published guidance, but it only noted 
existing regulations that “might restrict or prohibit crowdfunding activity.” Id. (citing Jörg 
Begner, Crowdfunding and Supervisory Laws, BAFIN, at 9 (3d Q. 2012) http://www.bafin
.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Mitteilungsblatt/Quarterly/bq1203.pdf?blob=publicationFile 
[http://perma.cc/453V-5J6J]. 
 185. Crowdfunding was legalized in Italy, but with minimal guidance. See Weinstein, 
supra note 72, at 443–44. Equity crowdfunding is limited to small businesses. See id. 
Companies that have existed for longer than forty-eight months or with revenues over 
€5 million by the second year are ineligible for crowdfunding. See id. at 444. 
 186. France has a unique system called “CIGALES,” which operates a federation of 
democratically governed clubs that pool their money to invest in “ethically operated small 
businesses or businesses with particular social or cultural goals.” Id. at 444–45. The clubs 
operate altruistically and do not require a return on their investments. Id. 
 187. For example, one U.K. funding portal has been presenting equity opportunities to 
investors without regulatory approval and is yet to be stopped. See id. at 441. Likewise, 
while German law provides for low investment caps, Seedmatch raised over €100,000 in 
violation of an unofficial and previously assumed limitation See id. at 447. 
 188. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 6D s 708 (Austl.). 
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perhaps only established equity crowdfunding platform to date.189 
ASSOB functions like a traditional stock market, and it is primarily 
self-regulated by the funding portals that operate within it.190 
Individual stock offerings are limited to “[twenty] unaccredited 
investors per year,” but offerings are unlimited as to “accredited and 
overseas investors.”191 
ASSOB illustrates that equity crowdfunding can be successful 
and not as risky as some commentators suggest.192 One study noted 
that as of April 21, 2014, more than eighty percent of firms financed 
through ASSOB were still functioning.193 There have been no 
reported incidents of fraud.194 Moreover, ASSOB is uniquely 
supportive of its issuers. ASSOB provides templates and appoints 
trained sponsors to assist issuers in the crowdfunding process.195 
ASSOB intermediaries often employ sophisticated finance and 
investment professionals that meticulously screen and select higher-
capability firms before listing firms on their portals.196 Additionally, 
the ASSOB lobby engages regulators “to build an environment that 
allows for capital-raising in a controlled yet not onerous 
environment.”197 
However, in ASSOB, the average contribution per investor is 
$30,000.198Although this number could be misleading—because high-
end contributions tend to greatly exceed the mean—it is far greater 
 
 189. See AUSTL. SMALL SCALE OFFERING BOARD, http://assob.com.au/ [http://perma
.cc/SS8T-W6XY] (“ASSOB matches entrepreneurs, job creators and business pioneers 
seeking growth capital with investors desirous of investing in high growth opportunities.”). 
 190. Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, IPLEDGE 
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.ipledg.com/crowd-funding-lessons-learned-in-8-years-of-equity-
crowd-funding/ [http://perma.cc/VR6N-7D6L]. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 179, at 1767 (suggesting fraud is a serious concern 
associated with crowdfunding); Palmiter, supra note 170, at 415 (identifying barriers to 
pricing disclosure under a crowdfunding exemption); Benjamin P. Siegel, Title III of the 
Jobs Act: Using Unsophisticated Wealth To Crowdfund Small Business Capital or 
Fraudsters’ Bank Accounts?, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 777, 796–99 (2013) (suggesting that lack 
of transparency, fraud, and potential investor losses under a crowdfunding exemption pose 
risks). 
 193. Richard Swart, The Truth About Crowd Selection and Crowdfunding Success, 
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014
/04/36354-truth-crowd-selection-crowdfunding-success/ [http://perma.cc/9UDT-DWG2]. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, supra 
note 190. 
 196. See Swart, supra note 193. 
 197. Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, supra 
note 190. 
 198. Id. 
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than the ideal investment sizes envisioned by advocates for 
crowdfunding in the United States.199 Furthermore, because only 
twenty unaccredited investors may participate in any individual 
offering,200 ASSOB does not necessarily lend itself to the entire 
“crowd.” Thus, although ASSOB does not provide an ideal prototype 
for a vision of equity crowdfunding in the United States, it does 
suggest a that a similar model could work. In any case, equity 
crowdfunding must first be tested and experimented with to remove 
any uncertainty—a task for which states are uniquely suited. 
C. The Advantages of State Regulation of Crowdfunding 
State legislators may be wary of passing a state crowdfunding 
exemption because a federal exemption is near, especially once the 
SEC passes the rules necessary to implement crowdfunding in the 
United States. Even if the federal exemption is imminent, 
crowdfunding may nonetheless be more appropriate for intrastate, 
rather than national, offerings. Consequently, regulators have opined 
that the SEC’s resources are better spent elsewhere.201 Regulating 
crowdfunding at the local level makes sense because most projects 
will be smaller, local projects.202 Local economic conditions tend to 
have stronger effects on small business, independent of the national 
economy.203 Moreover, given the small size of crowdfunded offerings, 
issuers, and individual investment amounts, states “have a more direct 
interest in these offerings.”204 Likewise, states are “in a better position 
to communicate with both the issuer and the investor to ensure that 
this exemption is an effective means of small business capital 
formation.”205 Finally, amid the major void of data available on the 
implications of crowdfunding, states should be empowered to fulfill 
 
 199. See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text. 
 200. Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, supra 
note 190. 
 201. The JOBS Act at a Year and a Half: Assessing Progress and Unmet Opportunities: 
Hearing S. 113-178 Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 60 (2013) (statement of Rick Fleming, 
Deputy General Counsel, North American Securities Administrators Association). 
 202. See id. 
 203. See, e.g., id.; Wendell Cox, How Texas Avoided the Great Recession, 
NEWGEOGRAPHY (July 20, 2010), http://www.newgeography.com/content/001680-how-
texas-avoided-great-recession [http://perma.cc/AL5P-DG95] (“Texas . . . fully escaped the 
“housing bubble” that did so much damage in California, Florida, Arizona, Nevada and 
other states.”). 
 204. See The JOBS Act at a Year and a Half: Assessing Progress and Unmet 
Opportunities: Hearing S. 113-178 Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, supra note 201. 
 205. Id. 
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their traditional roles as experimental laboratories in exploring equity 
crowdfunding.206 In any case, providing access to crowdfunded capital 
to entrepreneurs remains a prerogative and perhaps even a 
responsibility exclusive to the states. 
VI.  “WE CAN DO BETTER”: A NEW AND IMPROVED NORTH 
CAROLINA CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTION PROPOSAL 
North Carolina’s crowdfunding framework must focus on a 
reasonable regulatory balance that minimizes unnecessary costs and 
burdens on small businesses and startups, while protecting investors 
from undue loss, fraud, and abuse. H.B. 680 was a prudent bill that 
could have achieved that balance. This proposal retains many of H.B. 
680’s provisions, while proposing certain improvements. 
First, a new North Carolina crowdfunding exemption (the 
“proposal”) should retain several of H.B. 680’s provisions, including 
H.B. 680’s offering limits, offering-amount triggered disclosures, 
aggregate individual unaccredited investor limits, the “all-or-nothing” 
rule, and post-offering disclosure requirements, with some exceptions. 
This proposal can improve inherent shortcomings in H.B. 680’s 
disclosure requirements, including excessive costs, lack of utility, and 
risk of fraud by: (1) providing for standardized disclosures; (2) 
removing the requirement that issuers provide a “statement of 
significant risks,” in lieu of more general statements of risk; (3) 
providing for mandated investor education requirements; (4) 
promoting competition among intermediaries; (5) providing for 
mandated social networking features on intermediaries’ funding 
portals; (6) requiring intermediaries to retain at least fifteen to 
twenty-five percent of investor losses in the event of fraud; and (7) 
loosening H.B. 680’s resale restriction in lieu of vesting intermediaries 
with discretion to establish interportal, intrastate, secondary markets 
for crowdfunded securities. 
A. Proposed Offering Limits and Disclosures Triggered by Certain 
Offering Amounts 
The proposal should retain the offering limits and related 
disclosures proposed under H.B. 680. By not overburdening small 
 
 206. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 773 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.” (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
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companies with the costs of stringent reporting and compliance 
requirements, the relevant provisions of the original bill were 
sufficient to prevent prospective North Carolina startups from 
moving opportunistically to other states with less burdensome 
crowdfunding regulations. Additionally, reports produced by 
companies with little if any operating history would be useless to 
investors.207 Moreover, H.B. 680’s original limits—up to $1 million 
uninhibited by additional disclosures or expensive reporting 
requirements and up to $2 million with audited financial 
statements208—attracted overwhelming bipartisan support.209 
While there is no “magic number,”210 $1 million establishes a 
significant capital base for a company in its initial startup stages. 
Requiring audited financial statements for companies seeking over 
$1 million to $2 million seems reasonable given the higher amount of 
the offering, especially since those companies are more likely to have 
the requisite operating history and growth targets to justify requiring 
audited financial statements.211 
Raising these limits would likely provide no substantial benefits. 
While higher limits may make North Carolina more attractive to 
issuers seeking to use the exemption, neither any state exemption nor 
the federal exemption currently offer limits higher than $2 million.212 
These limits strike the right balance of minimizing burdens to smaller 
businesses at their most vulnerable stages and requiring further 
disclosures when businesses seek larger offerings after they have had 
 
 207. See, e.g., Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting 
Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 
64 (2011) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia 
University Law School) (noting that any company raising only $1 million is likely to be an 
early-stage startup with little operating history “or, possibly, even [without] financial 
statements”); Damodaran, supra note 42, at 5 (“The limited history that is available for 
young companies is rendered even less useful by the fact that there is little operating detail 
in them. Revenues are small or non-existent . . . and the expenses often are associated with 
getting the business established, rather than generating revenues. In combination, they 
result in significant operating losses.”); Georgia Quinn, SBA Office of Advocacy Requests 
Redo by SEC on Crowdfunding Regulations, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Jan. 17, 2014, 10:06 
AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/01/30154-sba-office-advocacy-asks-redo-sec-
crowdfunding-regulations/ [http://perma.cc/B32T-C8X9]. 
 208. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(3)(b). 
 209. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 210. Bradford, supra note 48, at 118. 
 211. See, e.g., Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting 
Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, supra note 
207, at 66–67 (“Because the maximum aggregate amount that may be raised in any 12-
month period is $1 million, this exemption is likely to be used primarily by early stage 
issuers that do not yet have an operating history or, possibly, even financial statements.”). 
 212. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012); infra note 214. 
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some success.213 Likewise, lowering these limits increases the risk that 
prospective North Carolina startups will move to other states with 
more favorable limits, most of which currently mirror H.B. 680’s 
limits.214 The North Carolina JOBS Act would have only required 
issuers seeking to raise greater than $1 million to provide audited 
financial statements.215 The federal exemption, by contrast, requires 
audited financials from issuers seeking to raise only $500,000.216  
Further, provisions requiring audited financial statements for 
small offerings217 undermine the purpose of the crowdfunding 
exemption.218 Audits are overly burdensome to small business 
startups because they are so costly.219 The SEC’s proposed rules 
estimated costs of $4,000 for the preparation and filing of the annual 
report for offerings of $100,000 or less; $14,350 for an annual review 
for offerings between $100,000 and $500,000; and $28,700 for the 
 
 213. See Damodaran, supra note 42, at 4–5 (describing the typical small business’s early 
struggles for revenue and later profitability). 
 214. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)(c) (West, Westlaw through Act 2015-520) 
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to $1 million without, and $2 million with audited financials); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-
4-2.08(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through July 31, 2015) (providing that issuers may raise up to 
$1 million without audited financials); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21(a)(3) (2013) 
(providing that issuers may raise up to $1 million without audited financials). But see ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304(6-A)(B) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 377 of the 2015 1st 
Reg. Sess.) (providing that issuers may raise up to $1 million but issuers raising over 
$500,000 must provide audited financials). 
 215. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(3)(b). 
 216. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(iii) (2013). 
 217. See, e.g., § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304(6-
A)(E)(5)(c) (West, Westlaw through ch. 377 of the 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (requiring audited 
financials for offerings greater than $500,000). 
 218. Companies using the crowdfunding exemption to offer up to $1 million in 
securities annually would be required to provide the same level of financial disclosure 
required of an emerging growth company, which may have revenue up to $1 billion, when 
conducting an IPO of unlimited size. See Comment Letter from Ernst & Young, LLP to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.ey.com/Publication
/vwLUAssets/CommentLetter_CC0389_Crowdfunding_3February2014/$FILE/CommentLet
ter_CC0389_Crowdfunding_3February2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/LC8F-GBTQ] [hereinafter 
EY Comment Letter]. Furthermore, it would be challenging for the principal executive 
officer to provide U.S. GAAP-basis financial statements without engaging a financial 
expert. Id. at 3. 
 219. An audit costs around “$15,000 to $20,000 for the smallest businesses and $50,000 
to $75,000 for middle-market businesses.” Gwen Moran, Looking to Borrow? An Audited 
Financial Statement Can Help, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.entrepreneur
.com/article/222806 [http://perma.cc/M3PU-7CQU]. 
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requisite annual audit for companies raising $500,000 or more.220 
Though inconsequential for established businesses, these costs can be 
extremely detrimental to a small business.221 Moreover, in addition to 
requiring issuers to pay for such audits,222 the costs to issuers of 
compliance and reporting would devour a significant chunk of capital, 
discouraging the use of the crowdfunding exemption.223 The SBA 
Office of Advocacy224 (“SBA Advocacy”) addressed this very concern 
when it submitted to the SEC its second comment letter in five 
years.225 Advocacy explained that forcing small businesses, which 
often have little or no revenue, to produce audited financial 
statements would be extremely detrimental relative to their cash 
flows and the levels of capital they seek to raise.226 
Worse, issuers would be required to incur these expenses up 
front, prior to qualifying for a crowdfunded offering.227 There is a 
substantial risk that after incurring these costs, the market may not 
support the issuer’s products, thus deterring issuers from using the 
exemption at all.228 Issuers may be incentivized to minimize these 
 
 220. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,521 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249). 
 221. In fact, this has been a source of concern expressed in various SEC comment 
letters. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Kiran Lingam, Gen. Counsel, SeedInvest, LLC, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1 (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-
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raise.”); see infra notes 227–35 and accompanying text. 
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and $112,500. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,521. 
 223. See EY Comment Letter, supra note 218, at 1. 
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burdensome” regulatory requirements. See Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 
94 Stat. 1164 (1980). 
 225. Quinn, supra note 207. 
 226. See Comment Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Ph.D, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1–2 (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.sba.gov/content/1162014-
crowdfunding-file-number-s7-09-13  [http://perma.cc/F7Y8-KE6X] [hereinafter Sargeant 
Letter]. 
 227. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(3)(b) (requiring issuers raising 
over $1 million to produce pre-offering audited financials).  
 228. See R. Kevin Saunders II, Note, Power to the People: How the SEC Can Empower 
the Crowd, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 945, 961 (2014). 
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preliminary costs229 by choosing a lower target-offering amount, 
“leaving the company undercapitalized and more prone to failure.”230 
Even if these expenses were tolerable, the financial audits and 
burdensome reporting requirements noted above miss the point. 
Their purpose is not to inform investors about the economic 
prospects of an investment, but rather to enable investors to make a 
fully informed investment.231 Audited financials produced by 
companies with minimal, if any, operational history or revenue are 
useless to investors.232 Indeed, venture capitalists rarely request 
audited financials,233 likely realizing the opportunity cost to their 
invested dollars, which may be better spent elsewhere. Certainly, 
concerns related to the riskiness of crowdfunded companies and fraud 
in online securities offerings are not without merit.234 But these 
concerns can be effectively mitigated in ways less burdensome to 
small issuers.235 
Nonetheless, offering limits and their accompanying disclosures 
are irrelevant unless issuers can solicit enough investors to buy into 
the issuers’ ideas. The next section discusses the intricacies of these 
challenges and the balance between limiting investor losses and 
easing issuers’ capital-raising efforts. 
B. Proposed Aggregate Annual Limits on Individual Investor 
Contributions 
The proposed exemption should retain H.B. 680’s $2,000 fixed 
aggregate annual limit on individual unaccredited investor 
contributions.236 The costs and complexity of verifying investor 
financials weigh against imposing a variable cap. Instead, the fixed 
 
 229. See supra notes 215–20 and accompanying text. 
 230. Saunders, supra note 228, at 962; see also J. Tol Broome Jr., Avoiding the Traps 
That Cause New Businesses To Fail, ANVIL MAG., Jan. 2001, http://www.anvilmag.com
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 232. See, e.g., Damodaran, supra note 42, at 5 (“The limited history that is available for 
young companies is rendered even less useful by the fact that there is little operating detail 
in them. Revenues are small or non-existent . . . and the expenses often are associated with 
getting the business established, rather than generating revenues. In combination, they 
result in significant operating losses.”); Quinn, supra note 207. 
 233. See Quinn, supra note 207. 
 234. See supra Section V.B. 
 235. See infra Section VI.D. 
 236. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(4) (2013).  
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amount should be reasonable to protect investors from risk of loss 
and fraud. “Reasonable” means not too high, thus protecting 
investors from risk of loss and fraud, but not too low, threatening the 
feasibility of crowdfunding as a capital-raising alternative. 
A variable approach ensures that investors’ crowdfunding 
investments are limited to a specific proportion of their income or net 
worth, effectively limiting the investor’s potential investment to a sum 
the investor can afford.237 By contrast, a fixed limit applies equally to 
all investors, not all of whom can reasonably afford the same 
investments. The lower the investor’s income or net worth, the less 
affordable a fixed limit becomes.238 
Nonetheless, fixed limits are more easily administered. Oddly, 
the SEC’s proposed rules do not require intermediaries to verify that 
each investor’s income is in compliance with aggregate investment 
limits for individual investors under a variable approach.239 Rather, 
investors would self-certify,240 leaving intermediaries to simply rely on 
investor representations.241 Even if intermediaries were required to 
verify investor income, the risks and costs to both parties might be 
prohibitive.242 
Regardless, it is unclear whether a variable limit could actually 
be enforced under a self-certification regime. Investors could falsely 
certify or overstate their income or net worth, defeating the purpose 
of the individual investment limit.243 Even honest investors may 
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mistakenly overstate their income or net worth when self-certifying, 
increasing the likelihood of financial distress in the event of loss.244 
For example, an investor may mistakenly believe that the value of her 
home may be counted towards her net worth, resulting in a risky 
crowdfunding investment that represents a large part of her savings.245 
A fixed investment cap provides a simpler and less expensive246 
approach than the federal JOBS Act’s variable approach.247 
Therefore, the wisest way to limit individual investments is to provide 
for a fixed dollar limit. 
Without quantifiable data on the “best” fixed individual 
investment limit,248 increasing or decreasing H.B. 680’s original $2,000 
investment limit249 would be largely arbitrary.250 The $2,000 cap is 
reasonable, neither too high nor too low.251 There are at least three 
reasons to maintain the $2,000 individual aggregate investment limit. 
First, “a uniform limit, unless it is very small, does not necessarily 
limit all investors to an amount they can afford to lose.”252 Moreover, 
adopting the higher, $5,000–$10,000 limits seen in other states253 may 
frustrate bipartisan support by reducing investor protection. If passed, 
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crowdfunding. Even limiting the exemption to relatively small amounts such as $250 or 
$500 does not mean that there is an insufficient investor-protection stake such that 
scrutiny is not warranted.”). 
 251. For example, the $10,000 limit seen in some states, like Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. 
§ 551.202(26)(d) (2013), could subject unwary investors to catastrophic losses. Other states 
have already attributed lower limits, like the former $1,000 limit in Kansas, to failures. See 
Simon & Loten, supra note 145. 
 252. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 127 (advocating for a $500 individual investment 
limit). 
 253. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)-d (West, Westlaw through Act 2015-520) 
(providing for $5,000 limit); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(E) (West, Westlaw through 
2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (providing for $5,000 limit); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304(6-
A) (West, Westlaw through ch. 377 of the 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (providing for $5,000 limit); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.2202a(1)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Mich. Pub. 
Acts 130) (providing for $10,000 limit); WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a) (2013) 
(providing for $10,000 limit); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2.08(1)(d) (West, Westlaw 
through July 31, 2015) (providing for $10,000 limit). But see KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-
21(a)(4) (2013) (providing for $1,000 limit). 
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higher limits may subject “foolhardy investors” to unbearable 
losses.254 Indeed, it may be wise to adopt a cautious approach given 
the uncertainty and potentially unforeseen risks associated with 
equity crowdfunding.255 
Second, a reasonable limit on individual investment is consistent 
with the purpose of equity crowdfunding, which is premised on 
soliciting a large, aggregate amount of funds from many small, 
individual contributions.256 Thus, a lower limit would not compromise 
the utility of an equity crowdfunding exemption. However, similar to 
low target-offering limits, an individual investment limit that is too 
low may frustrate offering success.257 Dismal offering prospects may 
cause prospective issuers to move to other states that provide for 
higher individual investment contributions.258 Moreover, lower 
investment caps are irrelevant if the investors they seek to protect are 
not participating in crowdfunding. That is, if low-income investors are 
investing responsibly or not participating in crowdfunding at all, then 
the costs of limiting the investment base outweigh any protective 
benefit to a miniscule minority of investors. Indeed, low-income 
Americans, unlike wealthier investors, tend to favor the safest 
investments, despite their lower performance.259 Even lower-income 
 
 254. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 140; Hazen, supra note 179, at 1766 
(“[Crowdfunding] also is likely to attract investors with limited funds who cannot tolerate 
high investment risk, even for small amounts of money.”). 
 255. See supra Section V.B. 
 256. See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text. 
 257. In fact, after Kansas issuers complained of difficulties in reaching their target 
offering amounts, Kansas increased its $1,000 individual investment limit, attributing 
failures to the low limit. See Simon & Loten, supra note 145 (explaining that Kansas 
increased its individual unaccredited investor cap from $1,000 to $5,000). Note also that 
Kansas has a smaller population relative to many other states, thus a smaller investment 
base to draw from. For example, as of July 2013, Kansas’s population was 2.984 million. 




VKA4] (comparing the population growth of North Carolina to Kansas over the previous 
century). Compare that to North Carolina’s population, which was 9.481 million as of July 
2013. Id. Thus, a higher $5,000 cap is probably not necessary in North Carolina. 
 258. See, e.g., supra note 257. 
 259. For example, low-income Americans favor gold over the stocks, bonds, and real 
estate favored by wealthier investors, despite the fact that gold has had the lowest returns 
over the last 200 years of any of those investment classes. John Aziz, Why the Poor’s 
Investment of Choice Is So Alarming, THE WEEK (Apr. 23, 2014), http://theweek.com
/article/index/260333/why-the-poors-investment-of-choice-is-so-alarming [http://perma.cc
/VXW6-ZK5L]. Likewise, given that these investors even prefer “plain-vanilla savings 
accounts and CDs over stocks,” it is unlikely that crowdfunded securities would appear 
attractive to them. See Jeff Cox, Lower-Income Investors Still Cling to Gold Hopes, CNBC 
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Americans that do prefer “safer” investments represent a small subset 
of low-earners, however, because most low-income Americans 
abstain from investing at all.260 
Third, the potential alternatives to a lower individual investment 
limit are unwise. Supporters of the individual investment cap have 
characterized it as “the fundamental investor protection in 
crowdfunding.”261 As noted above, the administrative challenges to 
implementing a variable approach are burdensome, and permitting 
self-certification under such a regime could subject investors to 
unbearable losses. Alternatively, a “free-market” approach, where 
investors could invest any amount of money risks subjecting investors 
to losses limited only by the investor’s liquidity.262 Likewise, if 
intermediaries, competing for investors, are charged with determining 
individual investor contribution limits, intermediaries could establish 
either unlimited or very high individual investment limits to attract 
more investors. Either of the preceding alternatives, which fail to 
protect investors, would likewise fail to attract bipartisan support. 
The reasonable $2,000 aggregate investment limit for individuals 
in H.B. 680 addresses these concerns—it is neither too high, nor too 
low.263 It targets a broad swathe of investors without blindly seeking 
 
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101603207 [http://perma.cc/83Z5-XYWE]. 
Differences in financial literacy, attitudes about future prospects of the economy, and 
familiarity, among other reasons, account for the difference. See id. Lower-income 
investors, in contrast to wealthy investors, prefer gold, which is a safer, pessimistic 
investment that will have value even when society breaks down. See id. “Rich people are 
by definition those who are doing well within the current economic system, while poor 
people are by definition not doing so well within it. So it’s totally unsurprising that the rich 
are expressing higher levels of confidence in a system they are doing well within, and the 
poor are expressing lower levels of confidence.” See Aziz, supra. 
 260. For example, in a 2012 Financial Capability study, 18% of respondents with 
incomes below $25,000 tried to plan for retirement, and only 11% of that group had 
nonretirement investments. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., INV. EDUC. FOUND., 
FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 14, 16 (2012), http://www
.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2012_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf [http://perma
.cc/9ZF5-ESE6]. 
 261. Saunders, supra note 228, at 972; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, 
Keeping It Light, Chairman White: SEC Rulemaking Under the Crowdfunding Act, 66 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 60 (2013) (“The annual cap is so important to the entire 
statutory scheme that the SEC should properly place a relatively heavy burden on 
intermediaries to enforce it.”). 
 262. See, e.g., Madoff Victims Recount the Long Road Back, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2013, 
6:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303560204579248221657387860 
[http://perma.cc/5DXA-M284 (staff-uploaded archive)] (discussing several victims who 
lost their entire savings to fraudster Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme). 
 263. However, the paternalism inherent in limiting individual investment in 
crowdfunding strikes the author as ironic, considering that Americans are free to do many 
risky things with their money. For instance, Americans “are perfectly within their rights 
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to protect a small group of merely potential investors or 
compromising equity crowdfunding’s feasibility as an alternative 
capital-raising mechanism. This provision is protective enough to 
generate the bipartisan support that the bill will need in order to pass, 
particularly when accompanied by other provisions specifically 
designed to protect vulnerable investors.264 
C. The “All-or-Nothing” Provision 
North Carolina’s equity crowdfunding exemption should also 
retain H.B. 680’s “all-or-nothing” provision. This provision requires 
that offering proceeds be held in escrow and released if and when the 
issuer’s campaign reaches the target-offering amount, as stated in the 
issuer’s pre-offering disclosures.265 Until the target is reached, 
investors should be able to withdraw their investments.266 Combining 
the “all-or-nothing” provision with the option to withdraw creates 
several protective benefits. First, it protects investors from losses 
resulting from making risky investments in undercapitalized 
companies. Second, it maintains checks on issuers by promoting 
responsiveness in funding-portal communication, weeding out 
potentially unsuccessful companies. Third, the “all-or-nothing” and 
optional withdrawal provisions encourage diligent planning. 
The “all-or-nothing” provision helps prevent investor losses in 
unattractive ventures by shifting to issuers the risk of loss due to 
undercapitalization. Moreover, since the “crowd” is comprised of a 
diverse array of investors, sophisticated and unsophisticated,267 the 
“all-or-nothing” provision makes it more difficult for unscrupulous 
issuers to poach unsophisticated or “foolhardy” investors.268 An “all-
or-nothing” provision works in tandem with interactive portals 
because investors can continue to share information while the 
offering is open, resulting in a more informed “crowd.”269 If an 
 
under current law to go to Las Vegas or Atlantic City and bet their entire lifesavings on 
one roll of the dice,” but are unable to invest their chosen amount in a crowdfunding 
venture. See 158 CONG. REC. H1222-04 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. 
Polis). If it is true that “[t]he line between gambling and investing is artificial and thin,” it 
seems inconsistent to allow unlimited gambling, but not unlimited investment. MICHAEL 
LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 256 (2010). 
 264. See supra Section VI.A; infra Sections VI.C–G. 
 265. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(c). 
 266. See id. 
 267. See infra text accompanying notes 388–90. 
 268. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 140. 
 269. See id. at 139–40. 
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investor “conclude[s], based on information shared, that an offering is 
not a suitable investment[,]” she can withdraw her bid.270 
Of course, the more liberal “all-or-something” provisions found 
in other state exemptions271 are not without merit. An issuer may 
avoid undercapitalization when retaining some of its offering 
proceeds, which may occur when the issuer covers upfront costs 
pursuant to its crowdfunded offering.272 The reduced risk will 
encourage more issuers to use the crowdfunding exemption, 
diversifying funding portal offerings and attracting more investors. 
Nonetheless, undercapitalization is just as likely to occur when 
funding falls far short of the issuer’s operating requirements, which is 
much more likely under an “all-or-something” regime. Then, in the 
event of failure, the loss is wholly owned by the investors, who were 
either unwilling or unable to withdraw their funds in the underfunded 
company. Furthermore, the threat that investors may withdraw their 
funds before the issuer reaches its target creates a greater incentive 
for issuers to be more responsive when communicating over funding 
portals. This communication mutually benefits both parties.273 Issuers 
receive free, tailored recommendations to improve their businesses.274 
Investors and customers can voice their concerns. Likewise, the “all-
or-nothing” provision provides an early indicator of success or 
failure.275 The issuer must convince investors that its venture is worth 
the risk.276 Thus, the market can reject the issuer’s idea before 
crowdfunding participants risk their money in an issuer’s unworthy 
venture. 
Finally, an “all-or-nothing” provision prevents issuers from 
overreaching or setting arbitrary targets.277 Since the offering will fail 
if it falls short of its target, issuers will budget more diligently.278 The 
“all-or-nothing” provision, therefore, protects vulnerable investors 
and incentivizes issuers to be responsive and diligent without 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(F)(vi) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st 
Reg. Sess.) (permitting investors to choose whether to cancel the investor’s commitment 
to invest if the target goal is not reached before the deadline stated in the disclosure). 
 272. See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text. 
 273. See infra Section VI.D.4. 
 274. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 135 (suggesting that recommendations may “help 
the entrepreneur refine her business plan”). 
 275. Cf. supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text. 
 276. See Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Crowdsourcing: Markets for 
Labor, Rewards, and Security, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 35, 44–45 (2015). 
 277. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 140. 
 278. Id. 
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significantly impeding issuers’ ability to utilize crowdfunding to raise 
capital. 
Like most other provisions, the effectiveness of the “all-or-
nothing” provision substantially depends on the disclosure 
requirements because of the upfront costs that disclosure 
requirements impose on issuers, as discussed above. 
D. Proposed Pre-Offering and Post-Offering Disclosures and 
Reporting Requirements 
As discussed throughout this Comment, nearly all provisions 
inherent in an effective crowdfunding regulatory regime depend upon 
useful, effective, and affordable disclosures, including the “all-or-
nothing” provision, investor contribution limits, investor education, 
intermediary regulation, and resale restrictions. North Carolina 
should improve on H.B. 680’s disclosure requirements, which would 
have required extensive and sometimes ambiguous issuer-drafted 
disclosures.279 Before explaining recommended disclosure 
requirements under the proposed exemption, it is helpful to 
understand the benefits and shortcomings inherent in certain 
disclosures. 
1.  Overburdening Small Issuers with Excessive Costs and Liability 
Disclosures are undoubtedly necessary because they provide 
investors with the information required to make informed investment 
decisions.280 Disclosures may also prove useful for appraisal purposes, 
especially since crowdfunded securities will be illiquid, and thus not 
easily valued if resale restrictions are retained.281 More importantly, 
mandatory disclosures help to prevent investors from being duped by 
 
 279. For example, H.B. 680 required “a discussion of significant factors that make a 
particular offering risky,” while also requiring issuers to display on the cover page of their 
disclosure documents a legend that warned investors of the risks of crowdfunded 
securities. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(13). The bill also required issuers 
to provide information regarding the differences among classes of securities. Id. sec. 2, 
§ 78A-17.1(a)(5)(b)(4). 
 280. See Brandeis, supra note 231, at 12. 
 281. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S 
HANDBOOK: UNIQUE AND HARD-TO-VALUE ASSETS 18 (Aug. 2012) (explaining 
potential difficulty with determining “hard to value or illiquid assets”); see also Azam 
Ahmed, For Sale: Illiquid Assets, Hard To Value, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 28, 2011, 
3:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/for-sale-illiquid-assets-hard-to-value
/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/W7HV-JFA2] (explaining hedge fund managers’ use of “side-
pockets” for illiquid investments such as toxic loans that would be sold at fire-sale prices 
after the financial crisis). 
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fraudsters, who historically have been successful at developing 
innovative scams in response to new technologies.282 
Disclosures, however, do not achieve these goals unless they are 
meaningful.283 Moreover, excessive disclosure requirements frustrate 
the core purpose of any crowdfunding exemption—increasing 
accessibility of capital to startups and small businesses.284 Many of the 
required disclosures under H.B. 680285 and other state exemptions286 
implicate “complex areas of corporate law and finance.”287 Under 
H.B. 680, issuers would likely be required to enlist professional legal 
and financial expertise to draft disclosure forms containing details 
regarding the issuer’s capital structure, rights and comparisons among 
its security classes, and quarterly reports.288 Similar to audited 
financial statements, such disclosures may be prohibitively expensive 
for small issuers to produce.289 
 
 282. Hazen, supra note 179, at 1767–68 (describing how several types of fraud schemes, 
including boiler-room sales operations, “pump-and-dump” schemes, and Ponzi schemes, 
have adapted to take advantage of new technologies). For a colorful illustration of how 
such operations work, see generally JORDAN BELFORT, THE WOLF OF WALL STREET 
(2013) (describing the rise and fall of Jordan Belfort, who founded Stratton Oakmont, a 
brokerage house that engaged in pump and dump schemes and other forms of securities 
fraud); see also What Is a Boiler Room Operation?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia
.com/ask/answers/04/080604.asp [http://perma.cc/8W5Y-8QFS]. Bernie Madoff operated a 
successful “Ponzi” scheme, in which he duped unsuspecting investors with promises of 
large returns and virtually no risk, only to pocket the investors’ cash for himself. See Diana 
B. Henriques, Madoff Scheme Kept Rippling Outward, Across Borders, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/business/20madoff.html?pagewanted=all&
_r=1& [http://perma.cc/G3D4-QK9B (dark archive)]. When the investors wanted to cash 
out, Madoff paid from the pool of other investors’ funds. See id. Madoff drew some 
skepticism as he consistently reported returns well above market rates, but it was not until 
the credit crunch in 2008 when Madoff’s scheme collapsed as investors rapidly pulled out 
their money. See id. 
 283. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 208.84(c)(6) (mandating meaningful disclosures). See 
generally ERNST & YOUNG, DISCLOSURE EFFECTIVENESS (2014), http://www.ey.com
/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-disclosure-effectiveness-what-companies-can-do-
now/$FILE/EY-disclosure-effectiveness-what-companies-can-do-now.pdf [http://perma.cc
/K3UL-9KGA] (describing how to make corporate disclosures more meaningful). 
 284. See supra Section VI.A. 
 285. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(b) (requiring disclosures such 
as a description of the company’s capital structure, the terms and potential modifications 
to securities, the differences among classes of securities, and how other classes of securities 
may affect the rights of crowdfunded securities).  
 286. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304(6-A)(E)(6) (West, Westlaw 
through ch. 377 of the 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (requiring a detailed description of the issuer’s 
capital structure). 
 287. John S. Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, 
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 
600 (2013). 
 288. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5), (c). 
 289. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
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At the same time, asking issuers to prepare a “discussion of 
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky”290 is not 
only redundant, but will likely require the employ of a securities 
attorney and possibly even an accountant, further increasing the 
upfront cost to the issuer.291 Furthermore, certifying a statement that 
outlines significant risks associated with the issuer subjects the issuer 
to uncertain levels of potential liability notwithstanding good faith.292 
It would be impossible to forecast all significant risks, especially for 
startups with limited or no operating history and no point of reference 
to identify such “significant” risks.293 Would a statement as general as 
“we could fail and lose your entire investment” be sufficient? 
Naturally, with a startup this is a significant risk, but these types of 
generic risks are better disclosed elsewhere in the form of a general 
disclaimer.294 Of course, this type of information is less specific, but a 
relaxed disclosure requirement would prevent issuers from subjecting 
themselves to liability potentially equaling the purchase price of the 
offered securities,295 thus reducing an issuer’s litigation risk without 
unduly degrading investor information when sufficient alternative 
disclosures are provided.296 
Thus, disclosures are necessary, but overburdening issuers with 
excessive costs and potential liability—only to provide disclosures 
that do not satisfy their purpose—is not helpful to issuers or investors. 
The next section discusses disclosures that overburden investors with 
too much information, or incomprehensible information, which is a 
significant part of the problem. 
 
 290. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(13). 
 291. See ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION: 
THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE 91 (1992) (noting broad demand for securities lawyers and 
the law firms that employ them). 
 292. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law 
from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. 
L. REV. 627, 627 (1996) (“When risky investments go wrong, brokers and customers may 
blame each other for the misfortune. Courts and others resolving these disputes must then 
decide whether the broker withheld information about the risk, or whether the customer 
knew about the risk and simply made a bad decision.”). 
 293. Even venture capitalists require some operating history to perform due diligence. 
See Venture Capital, supra note 35. 
 294. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7) (requiring issuers 
intermediaries to provide a legend to apprise investors of the general risks of investing in 
crowdfunded securities). 
 295. See infra note 409 and accompanying text. 
 296. See infra Sections VI.D.3–4 (proposing a simplification of the disclosure process 
by limiting the amount of complex information and providing simple, standardized 
disclosure forms). 
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2.  Limits on Disclosure Value for “Unsophisticated” Investors 
Even if the information described above could be had at a low 
cost, of what value is it to “unsophisticated” and nontraditional retail 
investors? The theoretical effectiveness of such disclosures for 
investor-protection purposes is informed by two assumptions: that (1) 
“unsophisticated” investors read the disclosures; and (2) they are fully 
capable of understanding the disclosures.297 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court’s “reasonable investor” standard explicitly endorses these 
expectations.298 Moreover, “courts expect reasonable investors to 
have an awareness of general economic conditions and to understand 
the principles of diversification, the time-value of money, the nature 
of margin accounts, and the securities industry’s compensation 
structure.”299 Theoretically, investors use information contained in 
disclosures to value an issuer’s securities or to make informed 
predictions on the economic prospects of the issuer.300 However, 
studies consistently show that a significant proportion of retail 
investors lack even basic financial literacy—a necessity for 
understanding these disclosures—which undermines the entire 
rationale for disclosure requirements.301 
Furthermore, the volume of information contained in the 
prescribed securities disclosures can create cognitively-crippling 
 
 297. Barbara Black, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: Reasonable 
Investors, Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1493, 1495–96 (2013) (“For example, a 
widow with a tenth grade education was expected to read and understand written 
disclosures about risk and illiquidity in a lengthy complex prospectus . . . .”). 
 298. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 233–34 (1988) (rejecting the notion that 
“investors are nitwits” and explaining that investors should not be ascribed “child-like 
simplicity”) (quoting Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also 
Black, supra note 297, at 1493–95 (noting the high degree of rationality ascribed to 
investors by courts and questioning whether that standard “comport[s] with observed 
reality”). 
 299. See Black, supra note 297, at 1494–95 (citing several cases where federal courts 
held the reasonable investor to meet relatively high standards of financial literacy). 
 300. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-698, MUNICIPAL 
SECURITIES: OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING CONTINUING DISCLOSURE 16 (2012), http://www
.gao.gov/assets/600/592669.pdf [http://perma.cc/2ETJ-325K] (recognizing that investors use 
disclosures to make investment decisions despite the fact that there is limited information 
on to what extent investors use disclosures); Beginners’ Guide to Financial Statements, 
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/begfinstmtguide.htm [http://perma.cc/Y9VL-V8SD] 
(asserting that financial statements provide “powerful information for investors[,] . . . the 
investor’s best tool when it comes to investing wisely”). 
 301. See, e.g., SEC, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS 
vii-viii (2012) [hereinafter FINANCIAL LITERACY], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012
/917-financial-literacy-study-part1.pdf [http://perma.cc/JSB2-Y875] (“[S]tudies have found 
that investors do not understand the most elementary financial concepts, such as 
compound interest and inflation.”). 
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information overload, causing investors to limit their attention to 
disclosures or avoid them altogether.302 In fact, an SEC study 
identified these concerns and suggested that disclosures be provided 
in summary form with “concise, plain language descriptions of 
important information.”303 At least one state’s crowdfunding 
legislation has attempted to address such concerns by requiring that 
certain disclosures, such as those identifying potential risks associated 
with an issuer, be “concise and organized logically.”304 
Even if the SEC’s efforts to reduce legalese and financial jargon 
in financial disclosures were successful,305 few if any synonyms exist 
for terms like “illiquidity”306 or “capital structure.”307 Moreover, 
 
 302. See generally Paredes, supra note 170, at 419 (arguing that more disclosure is 
ineffective, creating “information overload” and causing people to adopt “simplifying 
decision strategies that require less cognitive effort, but that are less accurate than more 
complex decision strategies”). 
 303. See FINANCIAL LITERACY, supra note 301, at xi-xii. 
 304. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(f)(2)(h)(i) (2013) (requiring “a discussion of 
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky” to be “concise and 
organized logically”). 
 305. The SEC has written a handbook, which explains that “[b]ecause many investors 
are neither lawyers, accountants, nor investment bankers, we need to start writing 
disclosure documents in a language investors can understand: plain English.” Arthur 
Levitt, Introduction to SEC, OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ASSISTANCE, A PLAIN ENGLISH 
HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 3, 3 (1998). 
Sixteen years after publication, it is unclear whether the handbook has effected any 
changes in the industry. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 283; FINANCIAL LITERACY, 
supra note 301, at xiii (noting, in 2012, that many commenters continue to advocate for the 
use of “plain language and common terminology”). 
 306. A thesaurus search yielded “no thesaurus results,” and instead, asked “[d]id you 
mean algidity[?]” Illiquidity Synonyms, THESAURUS.COM, http://www.thesaurus.com
/browse/illiquidity?s=thttp://www.thesaurus.com/browse/illiquidity?s=t [http://perma.cc
/D5ZQ-CBUX]. “Algidity” is a nominalization of the adjective “algid,” which means 
“chill, cold[.]” Algid, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961). 
However, in its required portal disclaimer of risk, N.C. H.B. 680 described illiquidity in the 
following terms: 
THESE SECURITIES ARE SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS ON 
TRANSFERABILITY AND RESALE AND MAY NOT BE TRANSFERRED 
OR RESOLD EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY SUBSECTION (E) OF SEC 
RULE 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(E) AS PROMULGATED UNDER THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED, AND THE APPLICABLE 
STATE SECURITIES LAWS, PURSUANT TO REGISTRATION OR 
EXEMPTION THEREFROM. INVESTORS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT 
THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO BEAR THE FINANCIAL RISKS OF THIS 
INVESTMENT FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. 
H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7). The certification that each purchaser 
must sign follows the disclaimer, requiring each buyer to acknowledge “[that] the 
securities I am acquiring in this offering are illiquid, that there is no ready market for the 
sale of such securities, that it may be difficult for me to sell or otherwise dispose of this 
investment.” Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(8)(c). 
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financial and operational statements require at least an intermediate 
level of mathematical competency.308 Disclosures that demand even 
intermediate levels of mathematical competency may be ineffective at 
informing “unsophisticated” investors, given that even lawyers are 
notorious for struggling with math.309 
Of course, navigating the legal and financial complexities 
necessary to write disclosures regarding complex topics requires legal 
or even financial expertise.310 Hence, disclosure language is still 
subject to interpretation by legal and financial experts and the 
accompanying expert biases that contribute to the 
incomprehensibility of disclosures. Two examples of such biases, 
among others, include “status quo [bias],” or the tendency to prefer 
things to stay relatively the same,311 and “curse of knowledge” bias, an 
inability to appreciate other perspectives, whether one’s own earlier 
perspective or that of another.312 Status quo bias is embodied, for 
example, in standard-form corporate charters and contracts in certain 
 
 307. No synonyms were identified on either Thesaurus.com or Investopedia.com. See 
Capital Structure, THESAURUS.COM, http://ask.reference.com/web?s=t&q=capital%20structure
&l=dir&qsrc=2891&o=10300 [http://perma.cc/NJ79-7GDJ]; Capital Structure Definition, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalstructure.asp [http://perma.cc
/A79Q-TRBX] (defining capital structure as “[a] mix of a company’s long-term debt, 
specific short-term debt, common equity and preferred equity . . . how a firm finances its 
overall operations and growth by using different sources of funds”). Of course, one could 
create a much simpler definition of capital structure, such as “the combination of debt and 
equity used to finance a company,” but even such a relatively simple definition may 
require explanation for the benefit of the retail investor. See Kenneth B. Firtel, Plain 
English: A Reappraisal of the Intended Audience of Disclosure Under the Securities Act of 
1933, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 851, 864–65 (1999). Even if one were to create an even simpler 
definition, such as “the amount of money that a firm borrows, combined with the money it 
uses from proceeds from shareholders, to finance its operations,” investors still need to 
understand why a disclosure would be telling them this, and the consequences that flow 
from a given capital structure. See id. 
 308. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in 
Disclosures That Require Investors To Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 927, 
943–44 (2007) (explaining how courts apply the general rule that failure to perform 
mathematical calculations for investors is not a material omission). 
 309. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner: Lawyers Bad at Math Are an Increasing 
Concern; Inmates Blood-Pressure Suit Shows Why, A.B.A. J.: SCI. & TECH. L. (Oct. 29, 
2013, 12:51 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/posner_math_block_lawyers_an
_increasing_concern_inmates_blood-pressure_suit/ [http://perma.cc/2HTP-Y4QF] (explaining 
Judge Richard Posner’s agitation with “lawyers who explain that they picked law over a 
technical field because they have a ‘math-block’ ”). 
 310. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 291, at 91. 
 311. See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 7 (1988) (“A series of decision-making experiments 
shows that individuals disproportionately stick with the status quo.”). 
 312. See, e.g., Susan A.J. Birch & Paul Bloom, The Curse of Knowledge in Reasoning 
About False Beliefs, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 382, 382 (2007). 
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industries, which perpetuate themselves for years without change the 
same clauses and contract language.313 While the ease and comfort of 
using time-tested language simplifies the process of drafting,314 it 
perpetuates disclosure incomprehensibility.315 Likewise, curse of 
knowledge bias “make[s] it difficult for experts to bridge the gap 
between themselves and novices because they have difficulty 
imagining ever having been so ill-informed on the topic and 
accurately imagining the information that novices might not know.”316 
Accordingly, even where lawyers and accountants attempt to simplify 
disclosures, curse of knowledge bias may stifle their awareness that 
certain terms, clauses, or even general financial concepts are 
unfamiliar to everyday people. 
As such, some disclosure requirements under H.B. 680 would 
likely have been more costly than effective, subjecting smaller issuers 
to burdensome expenses and potentially unlimited liability, without 
truly helping guide investors’ decisions. The revised exemption should 
provide for either standardized disclosures where issuers can “fill-in-
the-blank” or fill out disclosure tables, which provide a cost-effective 
alternative—both of which increase disclosure comprehension among 
investors.317 Among other requirements,318 H.B. 680 required issuers 
to produce pre-offering disclosures that included the terms and 
potential modifications to securities, the differences among classes of 
securities, and the total percentage ownership of the company that 
the offered securities represent.319 Further, like many other states’ 
crowdfunding laws, H.B. 680 required a “discussion of significant 
factors that make [the crowdfunded] offering speculative or risky,”320 
in addition to several mandated warnings of risk.321 Post-offering, 
 
 313. See Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the 
Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 178 (2011). 
 314. See id. at 177. 
 315. Pamela J. Hinds & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Why Organizations Don’t “Know What They 
Know”: Cognitive and Motivational Factors Affecting the Transfer of Expertise, in 
SHARING EXPERTISE: BEYOND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 3, 7 (Mark S. Ackerman, 
Volkmar Pipek & Volker Wulf eds., 2003). 
 316. Id. 
 317. See Wroldsen, supra note 287, at 629–31 (providing an example of a simple, easy-
to-understand disclosure table of venture capital deal terms). 
 318. See supra Section IV.A.3 (outlining disclosure requirements under H.B. 680). 
 319. See, e.g., H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(b). 
 320. See id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(13); WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(f)(2)-i (2013). 
 321. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7)–(8) (requiring a disclaimer 
legend and investor certification that the investor understands the risks of an offering); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-304 (LEXIS through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 70th Gen. Assemb.); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(H)–(I) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); 
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H.B. 680 required issuers to provide investors with quarterly financial 
and operational reports.322 
A new North Carolina crowdfunding exemption should retain 
most of the “core” requirements of H.B. 680, such as disclosure of 
issuer information, target offering amount, and the deadline to meet 
the target.323 Additionally, the exemption should require limited 
complex disclosure information, including details about capital 
structure and investors’ terms and rights under crowdfunded 
securities. The exemption should delineate specifically what 
information should be disclosed under these requirements. Finally, 
the discussion of significant factors that make a particular offering 
risky, and information regarding the differences among classes of 
securities should be omitted from the exemption. 
3.  The Benefits of Standardized Disclosures 
Many of the shortcomings inherent in disclosure requirements 
can be addressed by standardized disclosure forms. By providing for 
standardized disclosure templates that are concise and logically 
ordered, this proposal simplifies and improves on H.B. 680’s more 
exhaustive disclosure requirements.324 Similarly, the regulations can 
supplement and remedy disclosure shortcomings by mandating 
website features like chat portals, which provide more effective 
“organic” regulation, incentivize intermediaries to screen issuers, and 
meet investor education requirements. 
First, standardized disclosure templates will assist issuers with 
the costs and complexity involved in producing disclosures, much like 
the templates used for Regulation A offerings325 or the disclosure 
 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.2202a(1)(h) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Mich. Pub. 
Acts 130); WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(h)(i). 
 322. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(c). 
 323. See supra Section IV.A.3. Specifically, required disclosures should include 
background information about the issuer, its business plan, the target offering amount and 
deadline to reach the target, websites where the issuer’s securities will be offered, and any 
pending litigation involving the issuer. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-
17.1(a)(5). 
 324. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5), (a)(13), (c). 
 325. In the Advocacy comment letter to the SEC regarding the proposed rules, it 
requested that the SEC provide a simple “question and answer” format for nonfinancial 
disclosures, such as that used for Regulation A offerings, or boilerplate disclosures for 
more complicated nonfinancial disclosures. Sargeant Letter, supra note 226, at 4. See 
generally Regulation A Offering Statement, Form 1-A, 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (2015) 
(providing a “question and answer” format for information about the offering and tables 
for declaring information regarding both outstanding securities and the identities of 
directors, executive officers, and significant employees). 
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tables suggested by one commentator.326 Such disclosure tables would 
consist of a column that includes specific securities terms, followed by 
a column modified to match each relevant term.327 Templates would 
provide a free checklist to help issuers navigate financial- and legal-
disclosure requirements. Specifically, templates would lay out the 
relevant disclosure provisions for issuers, similar to a manual that 
would guide them in identifying what information to disclose. 
Moreover, standardized disclosure templates would remove the 
burden of drafting disclosures de novo, thus substantially reducing or 
even eliminating costs to attain legal and financial expertise.328 
Standardized disclosures also benefit investors. By prescribing a 
concise and logically organized standard template, regulators can 
ensure that the disclosures are readable, preventing attorneys from 
masking unsavory terms in legalese or otherwise burying information 
in an unorganized and complex document.329 Further, such 
standardized disclosures serve to mitigate status-quo and curse-of-
knowledge biases by channeling and simplifying drafting efforts by 
attorneys.330 
Standardized disclosures would become more transparent still 
when coupled with investor education materials.331 These disclosures 
would allow investors to locate specific provisions necessary to 
compare investment opportunities. Investors need only learn once 
where to look for each relevant provision, rather than taking the time 
to learn the format of each company’s proprietary disclosures.332 
More importantly, investor education would help ensure that 
investors understand the disclosures.333 This is especially important 
when applied to more complex information, discussed in the next 
section. 
 
 326. See Wroldsen, supra note 287, at 629–31 (providing an example of a simple, easy-
to-understand disclosure table of venture capital deal terms). 
 327. See id. 
 328. Cf. KHADEMIAN, supra note 291, at 91 (stating that federal securities laws and 
SEC policies force corporations, investment bankers, brokerage houses, etc. to rely on 
securities lawyers to ensure compliance). 
 329. See Firtel, supra note 307, at 875 (explaining SEC’s efforts via plain English to 
address dense boilerplate and obfuscation that “discouraged investors from reading the 
disclosure documents” or even rendered it “virtually impossible for investors to extract the 
significant information” from disclosures). 
 330. See supra notes 305–16 and accompanying text. 
 331. See infra Section VI.E. 
 332. See Wroldsen, supra note 287, at 626. 
 333. See infra Section VI.E. 
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4.  Required Disclosure of Limited Complex Information 
A successful crowdfunding exemption must strike a balance, 
effecting sufficient investor protection without overburdening small 
businesses and risky startups with excessive regulation and disclosure 
requirements. Minimal pre-offering disclosure requirements provided 
in some states’ crowdfunding exemptions offer simplicity and cost-
reduction, but they neglect one piece of the crowdfunding puzzle: 
investor protection.334 Thus, certain complex matters, including a 
description of the company’s capital structure and the terms and 
potential modifications to securities, should be provided in pre-
offering disclosures.335 Providing this information is important to 
ensure that investors know what they are getting when purchasing 
crowdfunded securities; ensure that investors may properly compare 
investment opportunities; and avoid chilling investment in 
crowdfunded companies. 
First, general statements of risk and communication features on 
funding portals that convey qualitative information should be 
substituted in place of a “discussion of significant factors that make 
the offering speculative or risky.”336 Second, contrary to H.B. 680’s 
requirement,337 quarterly reports should only be required once the 
issuer reaches a specified benchmark, not immediately after it 
completes its first offering. 
Third, information regarding capital structure and terms of 
securities338 should be limited to clear, basic information. Capital 
structure, or the mix of debt and equity a firm uses to finance its 
operations,339 is material to assessing a firm’s risk, and thus material to 
any investment decision. In particular, highly leveraged firms are 
generally riskier than well-capitalized firms.340 Higher debt may also 
 
 334. See ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)(c) (West, Westlaw through Act 2015-520) 
(permitting satisfaction of disclosure requirements when disclosure is made 
“simultaneously with the execution by the purchaser of a written agreement”); GA. COMP. 
R. & REGS. 590-4-2.08(1)(f) (West, Westlaw through July 31, 2015) (requiring the names 
and addresses of those involved in the issuance but not quarterly financial reports); KAN. 
ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21(a) (2013) (requiring only the names and addresses of the issuer, 
all persons involved in the offer, the bank or institution in which the funds will be 
deposited, and no quarterly financial reports). 
 335. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5). 
 336. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(13). 
 337. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(c). 
 338. See THE ACCOUNTANT’S HANDBOOK § 4.8(b)(v) (Lynford Graham ed., 2012), 
LexisNexis. 
 339. See Capital Structure, supra note 307. 
 340. See TOBIAS ADRIAN & NINA BOYARCHENKO, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., 
INTERMEDIARY LEVERAGE CYCLES AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 1–2 (2012), http://www
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afford investors a higher risk premium, and hence a higher expected 
return.341 Vice-versa, investors can identify safer assets by looking for 
firms with little or no debt.342 Young, small businesses may not have 
revenue streams sufficient to justify hiring a finance executive, many 
of whom command six-figure salaries for managing a firm’s capital 
structure and accounting practices and controls.343 Whether a firm has 
a finance executive or not, someone in the business must be charged 
with managing the business’s finances, especially its capital 
structure.344 
Moreover, the allocation of total debt and equity set out in a 
balance sheet should reveal an issuer’s capital structure.345 
Standardized disclosures or disclosure tables, where firms can simply 
check a box or fill in a blank, can make it even easier for firms to 
identify this information while ensuring that material information is 
available to investors.346 Firms that cannot identify their own 
fundamental financial metrics, especially with manageable 
standardized disclosures, should raise a red flag for investors. 
Investors may well associate financial incompetence with likelihood 
of failure, filtering out potentially unsuccessful firms and further 
improving the crowdfunding market.347 
 
.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr567.pdf [http://perma.cc/S54V-NU4H]. The 
financial crisis provides perhaps the best illustration of the risks inherent in using too much 
leverage. For example, by March 2008, when Bear Stearns had “a leverage ratio of more 
than 35-to-1, even a small loss of only 3.2 percent of the assets would obliterate stockholder 
equity.” Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd-Frank Act End Too 
Big To Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV., no. 1, 2012, at 1, 32. 
 341. See, e.g., ADRIAN & BOYARCHENKO, supra note 340, at 26 (describing the 
relationship between the risk of financial distress and the price of risk). 
 342. See, e.g., RAYMOND J. LUCIA & DALE FEATHERLING, READY . . . SET . . . 
RETIRE! FINANCIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE REST OF YOUR LIFE 111 (2007) (explaining 
that real estate investment trusts with little or no debt are safer but generally offer lower 
returns). 
 343. See, e.g., Darren Dahl, When Should a Small Business Hire a Finance Chief, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/business/smallbusiness/when-
should-a-small-business-hire-a-chief-financial-officer.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma
.cc/4CBJ-QCFD (dark archive)] (emphasizing that a small business should hire a financial 
executive as soon as it “can afford one”). 
 344. See id. (explaining that when the necessity of obtaining business capital causes a 
firm’s CEO to be “distracted from critical revenue-generating activities[,]” it is time to 
hire a CFO). 
 345. See Jeff Partnoy & Lynn Turner, Bring Transparency to Off-Balance Sheet Accounting, 
in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 85, 85–86 (2009), http://www.makemarketsbemarkets
.org/report/MakeMarketsBeMarkets.pdf [http://perma.cc/BF3G-CL32]. 
 346. See Wroldsen, supra note 287, at 628–32. 
 347. See Jill Hamburg Coplan, Raising Capital: Equity vs. Debt, BLOOMBERG BUS. 
(Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/09_72/s0912030511552
.htm [http://perma.cc/3ZJT-GVS9] (“Running your business without knowing your 
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Fourth, investors need to know what they are getting into. 
Knowing the terms and rights available under investors’ crowdfunded 
securities better informs valuation judgments and comparisons with 
other investments.348 If issuers are not charged with identifying the 
terms and rights associated with their securities, issuers could make 
up this information as they go along, to investors’ detriment. Without 
knowing the convertibility of a stock, for example, investors may 
enter into a securities transaction unaware that the stocks they had 
bargained for could be converted to debt with lower returns, no 
voting rights, and without a proper conversion discount.349 Moreover, 
investors cannot enforce rights that they are unaware of or that do 
not exist.350 
Fifth, reduced transparency can mislead investors. For example, 
abusive off-balance-sheet accounting351 partially contributed to the 
financial crisis by triggering “a daisy chain of dysfunctional decision-
making by removing transparency from investors, markets, and 
regulators.”352 Notably, institutional investors prefer to invest in firms 
that produce higher-quality disclosures.353 Scant disclosure may chill 
investment in crowdfunded companies by scaring off investors 
unwilling to take blind risks.  
However, excessive disclosure may upset the balance between 
investor protection and costs to small businesses where certain 
information adds little value and contributes to information 
 
numbers is like driving a car without being able to see your direction or speed . . . . It’s only 
a matter of time before you crash.”). 
 348. See William W. Barker, Outside Bucks, BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2000, at 15–16 
(explaining that documentation in private financings should include information about 
investors’ rights). 
 349. See Convertible Securities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/convertibles.htm 
[http://perma.cc/FVA8-TUYU] (identifying characteristics of certain convertible securities). 
 350. See Ira M. Millstein, Non-Traditional Modes of Enforcement, in ENFORCEMENT 
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THREE VIEWS 1, 3 (2005), http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm
/connect/6ab71c8048a7e7b3accfef6060ad5911/Focus_ENFCorpGov3.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
[http://perma.cc/M4JK-GE5D] (“Why would any sensible investor invest if investor rights 
either didn’t exist, or could not be enforced?”). 
 351. Off-balance-sheet items, including financial derivatives, are items for which a firm 
does not have legal claim or responsibility. Off Balance Sheet—OBS, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/off-balance-sheet-obs.asp [http://perma.cc/K7H4-DBU7] 
(“Off balance sheet items are of particular interest to investors trying to determine the 
financial health of a company. These items are harder to track, and can become hidden 
liabilities. Collateralized debt obligations, for instance, may become a toxic asset before 
investors realize a company’s exposure.”). 
 352. Partnoy & Turner, supra note 345, at 85. 
 353. See Brian J. Bushee & Christopher F. Noe, Corporate Disclosure Practices, 
Institutional Investors, and Stock Return Volatility, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 171, 172 (2000). 
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overload.354 Specifically, issuers undertaking an unnecessarily 
exhaustive analysis about differences among classes of securities and 
how other classes of securities may affect the rights of crowdfunded 
securities would surely require the expensive employment of financial 
and legal professionals.355 Investors must be charged with some 
diligence in making investment decisions. It should be enough that 
investors can ascertain this information themselves by reviewing an 
issuer’s financial statements—especially simplified disclosures—which 
is what such disclosures were intended for.356 
Sixth, quarterly reports, as noted above, should only be required 
if: (1) the issuer reaches a certain financial benchmark, such as 
operating cash flow; (2) the issuer solicits a second crowdfunded 
offering; or (3) resale restrictions are maintained after the restriction 
period. A benchmark is wise because, if the issuer has not achieved a 
requisite level of cash flow or operating history, it likely has not 
experienced the level of growth necessary to make periodic disclosure 
meaningful.357 A second offering may indicate an issuer’s need for 
further capital to sustain such growth. Moreover, the burdensome 
costs of periodic disclosures echo those of audited financials and 
other complex disclosures that require financial or legal expertise. 
Accordingly, producing periodic disclosures shortly after an offering 
may consume an issuer’s crowdfunding proceeds, which could be 
better applied elsewhere.358 
Of course, some of the information contained in the proposed 
disclosure requirements will not be immediately comprehensible to 
all investors. Especially if standardized disclosures are implemented, 
investor education requirements could be used to guide investors in 
navigating disclosure statements, thus helping to enhance investor 
protection. 
 
 354. See supra Sections IV.D.2–3. 
 355. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 291, at 91. 
 356. In fact, there are easily accessible resources instructing prospective investors how to 
determine capital structure from financial statements. See, e.g., Hans Wagner, Analyzing a 
Bank’s Financial Statements, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/07
/bankfinancials.asp [http://perma.cc/XV8X-29LF] (providing a crash course in financial 
statement analysis); see also Financial Statement Analysis, ACCOUNTINGTOOLS, http://www
.accountingtools.com/financial-statement-analysis [http://perma.cc/7J48-XNV6]. 
 357. See supra notes 283–96 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 217–30 and accompanying text. 
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E. Investor Education 
A new North Carolina crowdfunding exemption should follow 
the lead of other states and organizations359 by including investor 
education requirements. Educational requirements provide an 
additional safeguard to limit investor losses, increase investor 
comprehension, and help issuers to “positively affirm” that investors 
understand the risks inherent in equity crowdfunding.360 Investor 
education materials should be provided by the applicable state 
regulator,361 limited to relatively basic financial concepts, written in 
“plain English,”362 logically organized and concise, and constructed to 
supplement standardized disclosures. Investors should review a brief 
presentation, video, or reading materials. Then, investors should be 
required to pass a test or quiz before they may begin using a funding 
portal, to ensure that they have successfully used and understood the 
educational materials. All such educational materials and quizzes 
could easily be provided online. 
The applicable state regulator, rather than the intermediaries, 
should provide investor education materials to ensure uniformity, 
limit intermediaries’ ability to withhold adverse information, and 
reduce regulatory uncertainty surrounding potentially ambiguous or 
unclear curricula. Additional the provision of such materials would 
limit intermediary liability in the event of loss and ensure that all 
investors receive the same education, no matter which portal they 
 
 359. Other states and organizations have recognized the importance of investor education 
and have already begun introducing public and private educational materials to assist investors 
and issuers. See, e.g., Crowdfunding Professional Association Launches New Global Crowdfund 
Investing Education Network, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/news
-releases/crowdfunding-professional-association-launches-new-global-crowdfund-investing-
education-network-192244731.html [http://perma.cc/E9TM-M43W]; Georgia Crowdfunding 
Community, MEETUP, http://www.meetup.com/Georgia-Crowdfunding/ [http://perma.cc/2DXZ
-T24D] (providing a platform for crowdfunding participants in Georgia to meet, share 
experiences, and educate their community on different types of equity and debt-based 
crowdfunding); Information for Prospective Investors, TEX. ST. SEC. BOARD, http://www.ssb
.state.tx.us/Important_Notice/Information_for_Investors.php (last modified Nov. 7, 2014) [http:
//perma.cc/WS63-674N] (informing prospective investors about crowdfunding and providing 
guidance on deciphering certain disclosures); Informed Investor Advisory: Crowdfunding, 
NASAA,  http://www.nasaa.org/12842/informed-investor-advisory-crowdfunding/ [http://perma
.cc/HJ7F-63MM]. 
 360. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,470 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249). 
 361. In North Carolina, the securities regulator would likely be the Securities Division 
of the Department of the Secretary of State. See North Carolina Securities Division 
Homepage, N.C. DEP’T SECRETARY ST., http://www.secretary.state.nc.us/sec/ [http://perma
.cc/S6XY-FHVZ]. 
 362. See, e.g., supra notes 305 and 329 and accompanying text. 
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use. Then, intermediaries should be free to expand educational 
requirements, considering their unique businesses and investor 
bases.363 
These educational materials need not be exhaustive. Rather, they 
should apprise investors of the general risks and responsibilities of 
investing in crowdfunded securities, including, but not limited to 
instructing investors how to locate specific, basic information 
contained in pre-offering disclosures; helping investors understand 
certain disclosure terms; advising investors on the risks associated 
with startups and small businesses; and educating investors about 
crowdfunding regulations. 
There are several practical considerations that weigh against 
attempting to educate retail investors about more complex concepts. 
First, given the prolific financial incompetence among retail 
investors,364 educational materials serve only to bring investors up to 
speed on core concepts. Facing intimidating or complex concepts, 
unsophisticated investors may be discouraged from participating in 
crowdfunding. Moreover, test-passage rates may suffer, diminishing 
the crowdfunding exemption’s utility as an alternative capital-raising 
mechanism.365 In any case, most investors are unlikely to apply 
complex concepts when making their investment decisions.366 
Educational materials increase the user-friendliness of standardized 
disclosures, thus encouraging the examination of disclosures by 
investors. Educational materials could direct investors to information 
contained in standardized disclosures relevant to compare investment 
opportunities.367 
 
 363. See, e.g., Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,470. 
 364. See, e.g., FINANCIAL LITERACY, supra note 301, at vii-viii (“[S]tudies have found 
that investors do not understand the most elementary financial concepts, such as 
compound interest and inflation.”). 
 365. Cf. id.; Walter Hamilton, Millions of Americans Lack Basic Financial Literacy, 
Studies Show, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/27/business
/la-fi-financial-literacy-20131228 [http://perma.cc/Z6WU-NHAL] (suggesting that prolific 
financial illiteracy should be met with simpler financial products, rather than, or in 
addition to, financial education). 
 366. See FINANCIAL LITERACY, supra note 301, at vii-viii. Likewise, a recent survey 
revealed that an overwhelming amount of potential investors chose not to invest, fearing 
“talk[ing] to anyone about their money, and that’s partly because they seem[ed] to fear 
looking stupid or revealing how little they [knew] about investing.” Kimberly Palmer, Why 
Millennials Are Scared To Invest, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 31, 2014, 8:50 AM), http://money
.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2014/10/31/why-millennials-are-scared-to-
invest [http://perma.cc/7SN7-RF3R]. 
 367. See Wroldsen, supra note 287, at 630 (providing an example of a simple, easy-to-
understand disclosure table of venture capital deal terms). 
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Educational requirements also address some of the major 
shortcomings of required disclosures. First, disclosures do not ensure 
that investors read or understand them,368 only that the information is 
put in front of the investors, similar to “clickwrap” agreements369 that 
buyers rarely read.370 Conditioning access to the portal on the passage 
of a test is a sound, functional way to ensure that educational 
materials are read and understood. 
However, requiring the state to produce and promulgate investor 
education materials will result in additional costs to taxpayers—a 
significant political hurdle and a drawback when compared to H.B. 
680’s lack of any such requirement beyond investor self-certification 
that the investor understands the relevant risks of crowdfunded 
securities.371 To mitigate these concerns, the applicable state regulator 
could assess fees from intermediaries at a reasonable rate to cover the 
costs of providing educational materials. Additionally, cost-savings 
from reduced and standardized disclosure requirements would help 
balance any minimal assessment imposed by the state. 
Further, North Carolina could simply provide a curriculum and 
final quiz that investors must pass, rather than furnishing the investor 
educational materials. Intermediaries would then produce compliant 
educational materials at their own expense. Such a requirement 
would also empower the intermediary, who is most familiar with its 
business and investor base,372 to tailor its educational materials to its 
target audience of investors. Moreover, it would prevent 
intermediaries from undermining investor-education requirements. If 
educational materials are inadequate, investors would fail the 
required quiz, reducing investment via the funding portal. 
 
 368. See supra Section VI.D.2. 
 369. “A ‘clickwrap’ agreement appears when a user first installs computer software 
obtained from an online source or attempts to conduct an Internet transaction involving 
the agreement, and purports to condition further access to the software or transaction on 
the user’s consent to certain conditions there specified; the user ‘consents’ to these 
conditions by ‘clicking’ on a dialog box on the screen, which then proceeds with the 
remainder of the software installation or Internet transaction.” Kevin W. Grierson, 
Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or “Shrinkwrap” Agreements Common in Computer 
Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R.5th 309, 317 n.1 (2003). 
 370. See Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? 
Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 1, 14 (2009). 
 371. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(8). 
 372. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,471 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249). 
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Alternatively, the state may consider borrowing educational materials 
that are already being produced by other entities.373  
By following this proposal, intermediaries would essentially be 
regulated by market incentives as they compete to attract investors. 
The next section provides a comprehensive discussion of this 
intermediary regulation beyond educational requirements. 
F. Intermediary Regulation 
Wisely, H.B. 680 did not burden intermediaries with excessive 
regulation, but rather elected to stimulate market competition.374 
Intermediaries should largely be governed by competitive market 
incentives to: combat fraud, feature quality companies, offer value-
added services to assist issuers, and provide funding portal features to 
assist both issuers and investors. 
Promoting competition among intermediaries is essential to a 
successful crowdfunding exemption.375 Competition can mitigate the 
shortcomings of both ineffective and reduced disclosure 
requirements. First, intermediaries’ and issuers’ interests are normally 
aligned376—attracting investors is fundamental to both parties’ 
success. The more investors that an issuer attracts, the more likely the 
issuer’s crowdfunded offering will be successful. Likewise, since 
intermediaries will profit from fees equal to a percentage of the funds 
raised by its issuers’ crowdfunded offerings, intermediaries are 
incentivized to feature successful issuers that attract more investors.377 
 
 373. The North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) already 
has helpful crowdfunding and related investor educational materials on its website. 
Investor Education, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/investor-education/ [http://perma.cc
/9UM8-9LQH]; see also supra note 359 and accompanying text. 
 374. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(9)–(11). 
 375. See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http:// www.sec.gov/about
/laws.shtml [http://perma.cc/9SWW-NRBK]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) (requiring 
the SEC to consider “whether an action is . . . in the public interest, . . . [for] the protection 
of investors, [and] whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation”); Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 app. at 103–04 (2014) (directing executive agencies to reevaluate existing rules while 
maintaining a regulatory system that promotes “economic growth, innovation, 
competitiveness, and job creation”). 
 376. Abnormal circumstances might include fraud. 
 377. For example, according to a 2013 study, Kickstarter had over 110,000 campaigns, 
raising an aggregate of $612 million, with forty projects that raised over $1 million and a 
total campaign success rate of 44%. By comparison, Indiegogo had only 44,000 campaigns, 
raising an aggregate total of $44 million, with only four projects that raised over $1 million 
and a total campaign success rate below 34%. Jonathan Lau, Dollar for Dollar Raised, 
Kickstarter Dominates Indiegogo SIX Times Over, MEDIUM.COM (Aug. 28, 2013), 
https://medium.com/@jonchiehlau/dollar-for-dollar-raised-kickstarter-dominates-
indiegogo-six-times-over-2a48bc6ffd57 [http://perma.cc/U7TE-B5S4]. The study attributed 
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Moreover, intermediaries will earn reputational goodwill by featuring 
the best companies. If intermediaries feature low-performing 
companies or companies that tend to fail, investor goodwill and 
patronage will diminish. Issuers will avoid sites that fail to generate 
sufficient investor traffic, where funding prospects are gloomy. 
Hence, success begets success—issuers’ natural attraction to 
successful intermediaries will improve the quality of companies that 
intermediaries feature on their websites. 
As a result, intermediaries have strong market incentives to 
rigorously screen the companies they feature. Recognizing that fraud 
is bad for business,378 this practice may account for some of ASSOB’s 
success.379 Specifically, revelation of fraud within a particular funding 
portal may stymie investment in that portal.380 To avoid stigma 
associated with a defrauded funding portal, issuers may choose 
alternative portals to showcase their startups. 
Moreover, intermediaries may compete by offering premium 
services to their issuers, increasing the likelihood of issuer success. 
Intermediaries can increase their marketability by providing 
professional services and templates to assist issuers in navigating the 
 
Kickstarter’s success to the quality of companies it offers. Id. Indeed, the two competitors 
have different funding models: “Indiegogo accepts anybody. Kickstarter does not. 
Indiegogo gives campaigns the option of keeping all of the money if they miss their goal. 
Kickstarter does not.” David Holmes, Infographic: Kickstarter vs Indiegogo, PANDODAILY 
(Oct. 14, 2013), http://pando.com/2013/10/14/infographic-kickstarter-vs-indiegogo/ [http://perma
.cc/SQY2-J4XY]. 
 378. See, e.g., Howard M. Rossen & Howard H. Fairweather, Damages in Fraud 
Actions, 13 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REV. 288, 289 (1964) (noting that tort law recognizes 
damages in actions for fraud for injury to a plaintiff’s business reputation); Richard I. 
Werder, Jr. & John M. Newman, Jr., Rico [sic.] as a Vehicle for Intracorporate Claims by 
Nontarget “Perpetrator” Corporations, 46 BUS. LAW. 1391, 1392 (1991) (explaining that 
RICO actions against officers and directors are increasingly made by shareholders when 
the company itself defrauded a third-party, resulting in damage to its business reputation 
or a reduction in its stock value). 
 379. Many intermediaries operating in Australia use finance and investment 
professionals to complete screening and curation of prospective crowdfunding candidates. 
See Swart, supra note 193. Correlated or not, more than eighty percent of the firms 
financed through ASSOB are still functioning. Id. Compare this with the success rate of 
new American firms, half of which are still in existence after five years. See Frequently 
Asked Questions, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sbfaq.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/595V-YGU3]. 
 380. Cf., Qingbo Yuan & Yunyan Zhang, The Real Effects of Corporate Fraud: 
Evidence from Class Action Lawsuits, J. ACCT. & FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4) 
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459279 [http://perma
.cc/VP87-TBYE] (finding that “total external financing significantly decreases after 
corporate fraud revelation”). 
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crowdfunding process,381 and even lobby and communicate with 
regulators to improve the crowdfunding environment.382 
A new crowdfunding exemption can take advantage of these 
market based incentives with at least two additional intermediary 
regulations that would enhance investor protection without 
compromising competition: (1) providing for mandated chat features 
on intermediary funding portals; and (2) requiring intermediaries to 
have “skin-in-the-game” by requiring them to absorb some loss in the 
event of fraud. At a minimum, to ensure a comprehensive regulatory 
regime, intermediaries should be required to provide a “community” 
or “crowd” chat feature on their portals.383 Interactive portals provide 
a valuable tool by facilitating feedback, dialogue, and questions from 
the crowd, which produce richer qualitative information.384 
Crowdfunding portals will facilitate open communication between 
investors, potential customers, and entrepreneurs, allowing the three 
groups to align their interests. Issuers receive “free, crowdsourced-
brainstorming,”385 benefitting from customer feedback before 
spending substantial sums on production. Issuers can then apply the 
information provided by investors and customers to perfect their 
businesses, to field questions, and to proactively address customer 
needs before entering the market, ultimately improving the likelihood 
of issuer success.386 
Interactive crowdfunding portals also align nicely with 
crowdfunding’s accelerated development cycle, giving issuers 
incentive to respond to investor concerns as they promote, test, and if 
 
 381. The ASSOB requires issuers to choose a “sponsor” that provides these services. See 
ASSOB: Australia’s Largest Capital Raising Platform for Growing, Unlisted Companies, 
CROWD CAFE, http://www.thecrowdcafe.com/platform/assob/ [http://perma.cc/C6YC-XJBP]. 
 382. Indeed, intermediaries operating within ASSOB have “helped shape the equity 
raising landscaping in Australia by lobbying and engaging regulators to build an 
environment that allows for capital raising in a controlled yet not onerous environment.” 
See Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, supra note 
190. 
 383. In its proposed rules, the SEC required intermediaries to provide such a feature. 
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,430 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249). 
 384. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the 
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 846 (2014) 
(discussing the “richer, but more dynamic disclosure environment in which investors, as 
well as issuers and intermediaries” contribute to the mix of available information). 
 385. The Benefits of Crowdfunding, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/learn
/resources/guides/crowdfunding-guide/the-benefits-of-crowdfunding [http://perma.cc/464H
-EUUP]. 
 386. See, e.g., Greenstein, supra note 165 (discussing a recent study that found focusing 
too much on the product and not enough on customers was a main contributor to startup 
failure). 
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necessary, discard their ideas.387 Thus, issuers are incentivized to 
respond to investor concerns. Investors can satisfy their concerns by 
providing tailored advice or asking questions that disclosures do not 
answer. Moreover, the crowd will be composed of investors of various 
levels of sophistication and expertise.388 Investors will, as always, have 
different expectations and goals.389 Nontraditional investors will 
benefit from access to knowledge conveyed by sophisticated 
investors.390 Hence, communication portals enable the crowd to 
inform itself. 
Furthermore, while intermediaries cannot entirely prevent 
business failures or economically driven investor losses, they can, with 
the help of smart regulations, prevent fraud and create a safer 
crowdfunding experience for investors.391 First, a new North Carolina 
exemption should retain H.B. 680’s requirement that intermediaries 
avoid conflicts of interest.392 But this, alone, is not enough, and so 
intermediaries should be required to have some “skin in the game,”393 
absorbing at least 15% to 25% of investor losses in the event of fraud. 
This offers two benefits. First, it provides fraud insurance to help 
 
 387. See Leonhardt, supra note 166 (“New ideas will be free market tested earlier in 
their development cycle and discarded or funded at a faster rate. The old innovators 
mantra of try a lot of stuff and keep what works will be applied at hyper speed rates.”). 
 388. See Heminway, supra note 384, at 831 n.15 (“Crowdfunding . . . . draws its 
maximum power when the collective diversity is the greatest.” (quoting KEVIN LAWTON 
& DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION: HOW TO RAISE VENTURE 
CAPITAL USING SOCIAL MEDIA 181 (2013))). 
 389. Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair 
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1238 (1990) (arguing that the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model does not take into account that investors have different expectations, and 
thus value securities differently). 
 390. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,531 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249) (“[I]t is likely that investors and interested 
participants would provide relevant adverse information about an issuer or an offering 
through postings on chat sites, message boards, and other communication channels, 
including, but not limited to, the communication channels to be provided by the 
intermediary.”). 
 391. See Hazen, supra note 179, at 1754; cf. supra Section V.B. 
 392. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(11)-(12). 
 393. A similar provision is found in the Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 941(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1893–
94 (amending the Securities Exchange Act at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) et seq. (2010)). While that 
rule applies to originators and mortgage lenders, and thus carries its own unintended 
consequences, see Chris Arnold, Forcing Banks To Put More ‘Skin in the Game’, NPR 
(June 18, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105558991 
[http://perma.cc/QJ5D-HNNE]. Such a provision is more beneficial here, insofar as it gives 
intermediaries an incentive to screen issuers and prevent fraud. Cf. id.; Floyd Norris, 
Banks Again Avoid Having Any Skin in the Game, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/business/banks-again-avoid-having-any-skin-in-the-game.html 
[http://perma.cc/LD4W-3S2Q (dark archive)]. 
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moderate investor losses. Second, it incentivizes intermediaries to 
diligently screen and monitor issuers both before and after featuring 
issuers on their websites. Of course, an intermediary may still recover 
by seeking subrogation394 from a fraudulent issuer. 
Intermediaries will play a tremendous role in any crowdfunding 
environment. In addition to intermediaries’ roles of connecting 
investors to entrepreneurs, intermediaries may also play an integral 
role as the brokers of a secondary market if resale restrictions are 
lifted. 
G. Resale Restrictions 
A new North Carolina crowdfunding exemption should loosen 
H.B. 680’s resale restriction, which would have prohibited investors 
from selling or transferring securities for a certain period after 
issuance.395 A new exemption should permit issuers to establish a 
limited, intrastate, interportal secondary market for crowdfunded 
securities. 
Despite the shortcomings inherent in resale restrictions, 
commentators have suggested two potential benefits associated with 
them. First, a resale restriction may serve to protect secondary market 
investors, who do not have direct access to the information on the 
crowdfunding portal, from fraud.396 Second, it affords investors a 
period “to observe the performance of the business” and gather 
information about its economic prospects “before trading occurs.”397 
This proposal reflects the views of critics of resale restrictions398 
who assert that the consequences of the resale restriction outweigh its 
 
 394. For purposes of this Comment, subrogation refers to the right of the intermediary, 
after compensating investors for losses resulting from fraud, to pursue the third-party 
fraudster in an action to recover those losses. See, e.g., Subrogation, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/subrogation.asp [http://perma.cc/M46Y-6DL6]. 
 395. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7). 
 396. Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: 
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 954 (2011). 
 397. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,526 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249). 
 398. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 144–45 (explaining that investors unaware of such 
restrictions may be exposed to liability and that issuers could lose their exemptions if 
resale restrictions are “given any teeth”); Sherief Morsy, Note, The JOBS Act and 
Crowdfunding: How Narrowing the Secondary Market Handicaps Fraud Plaintiffs, 79 
BROOK. L. REV. 1373, 1393–99 (2014) (arguing that resale restrictions limit private 
securities fraud remedies). The SEC has explained that its proposed one-year resale 
restriction could “reduce trading liquidity, raise capital costs to issuers and limit investor 
participation, particularly for investors who cannot risk locking up their investments for 
this period.” Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,526. 
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potential benefits.399 Specifically, resale restrictions have four negative 
consequences, some of which have been identified by the SEC in its 
own proposed rules.400 First, a resale restriction will render 
crowdfunded securities illiquid, which would effectively tie up 
investor capital in their crowdfunded securities, preventing investors 
from cashing out, even if they wanted to.401 Valuation will be difficult 
without a market to determine prices. Second, investors will require 
higher returns resulting from the higher liquidity premiums attributed 
to illiquid crowdfunded securities, thus raising capital costs to 
issuers.402 Third, the resale restriction will “limit investor 
participation, particularly for investors who cannot risk locking up 
their investments for this period.”403 Finally, the resale restriction will 
limit private securities fraud remedies available to investors.404 
Securities fraud and civil liability provisions of Securities Act 
section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 apply to crowdfunding 
transactions.405 Additionally, a new provision, section 4A(c) of the 
Securities Act,406 furnishes to crowdfunding investors in offerings 
made under Title III of the JOBS Act the remedies available under 
section 12(a),407 which provides for liability if the issuer in the offer or 
sale of the securities “makes an untrue statement [or omission] of a 
material fact.”408 An investor that brings a successful action pursuant 
 
 399. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,526. The SEC further explained that the 
“illiquidity cost would be mitigated, in part, by provisions that allow investors to transfer 
the securities” during the resale restriction period in limited circumstances. Id. Those 
included “reselling the securities to accredited investors, back to the issuer or in a 
registered offering or transferring them to certain family members or trusts of those family 
members. These provisions likely would improve the liquidity of these securities and, thus, 
could increase investor participation in securities-based crowdfunding offerings.” Id. 
 400. See id. 
 401. See id. (“The restrictions on resales, however, may impede price discovery.”). 
 402. See generally, Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity, the Value of the 
Firm, and Corporate Finance, 2 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 17, 32 (2008) (arguing that a 
company’s “liquidity risk” is an important factor affecting the company’s value). 
 403. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,526. 
 404. For a more thorough discussion on the limitations of private securities remedies 
under a crowdfunded securities resale restriction, see generally Morsy, supra note 398 
(describing how a resale restriction would harm plaintiffs in a crowdfunded securities 
fraud case). 
 405. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act prohibit fraud and misstatements in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2013); see also Hazen, supra note 179, at 1769 (noting that, in addition to civil 
liability provisions, “mandated disclosures” are another form of “investor protection”). 
 406. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(1)(B) (2013) (“An action brought under [§ 77d-1] shall be 
subject to the provisions of section 77l(b) of this title and section 77m of this title, as if the 
liability were created under section [12] of [the Securities Act].”). 
 407. § 77d(a)(2). 
 408. See § 77d-1(c)(2)(A). 
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to section 4A(c) may recover the price paid for the security, or 
damages if the investor has already sold the security.409 However, as 
under sections 12(b) and 13 and Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must prove 
“loss causation.”410 That is, damages are limited to loss of the 
security’s value that result from material misstatements or 
omissions.411 But without a secondary market to provide price 
information412 an investor will find it difficult to prove loss 
causation.413 In any case, if a plaintiff cannot sell his shares in 
response to a misstatement or omission, the result under a resale 
restriction is no harm, no foul.414 
Nonetheless, intrastate crowdfunding exemptions, as opposed to 
the federal exemption, are only available under section 3(a) of the 
Securities Act, which requires all investors to reside in the state where 
securities are issued.415 Thus, a secondary market option faces an 
obstacle where investors in the issuer’s state could circumvent the 
exemption by purchasing and then reselling crowdfunded securities to 
nonresidents of the issuer’s state. The secondary–market maker416 
would have to certify that crowdfunded securities purchased on its 
exchange are purchased by state residents. 
 
 409. See § 77d-1(c)(1)(A). 
 410. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345–46 (2005) (holding that a 
plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 action must establish a causal connection between the fraudulent 
transaction and the resulting damages). 
 411. 4 THOMAS L. HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.11(3) (6th ed. 
2009). 
 412. See SEC Proposes Rules To Implement Crowdfunding Exemption: What Factors 
Will Affect Its Success?, GIBSON DUNN (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com
/publications/pages/SEC-Proposes-Rules-to-Implement-Crowdfunding-Exemption-What-
Factors-Will-Affect-Its-Success.aspx [http://perma.cc/QRP8-AG2Y]. 
 413. See Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011) (“As we 
have explained, loss causation is a familiar and distinct concept in securities law; it is not 
price impact.”); Morsy, supra note 398, at 1404. 
 414. Morsy, supra note 398, at 1398 (“[W]hen the [material misstatement] was made, if 
the plaintiff could not sell his shares, how could the statement have been said to damage 
the plaintiff at all?”). 
 415. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012) (corresponds to the amendments to the Securities 
Act of 1933 that were contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 201, 48 
Stat. 881, 905 (exempting intrastate offerings from SEC registration so long as the issuer is 
a business organized in the state where its securities are issued and all investors reside in 
that state)). 
 416. “A ‘market maker’ is a firm that stands ready to buy and sell a particular stock on 
a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted price. You’ll most often hear about 
market makers in the context of the Nasdaq or other ‘[OTC] markets.’ ” Market Maker, 
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mktmaker.htm [http://perma.cc/B7SL-ET8Q]. 
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Ideally, an established market similar to Over-the-Counter-
Bulletin-Boards (“OTCBB”),417 which rely on traders to supply 
pricing information,418 or Second Market, where companies can 
transact private-placement offerings,419 would be most desirable.420 
Once again, either alternative would be limited to intrastate trading 
unless one of two things occurs: either the SEC curbs the resale 
restriction in the federal exemption421 before finalizing its proposed 
rules422 so that securities could be traded on national exchanges; or 
Congress modifies the section 3(a) intrastate securities offerings 
exemption423 to permit interstate trading in securities issued under 
intrastate exemptions.424 Given the dismal prospects of either event 
occurring, an intrastate secondary market remains the lone 
alternative. 
A secondary market for North Carolina crowdfunded securities 
would be made possible by vesting intermediaries with discretion to 
facilitate interportal, intrastate-crowdfunded securities trading. Under 
the section 3(a) intrastate securities offerings exemption, 
intermediaries are required to verify that investors are state 
residents.425 Once verified, crowdfunded securities could be traded 
among investors either within or between portals. Investors would all 
have access to the same information posted on each online portal. 
 
 417. An OTCBB is “an electronic quotation system that displays real-time quotes, last-
sale prices and volume information for many over-the-counter securities that are not listed 
on a national securities exchange.” OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB), SEC, http://www.sec
.gov/answers/otcbb.htm [http://perma.cc/45Q2-4ZPV]. 
 418. Investor Information, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org
/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparency/OTCBB/ [http://perma.cc/2PKK-ATBX] 
(“Subscribing market makers can utilize the OTCBB to enter, update, and display their 
proprietary quotations in individual securities on a real-time basis.”). 
 419. SECOND MARKET, https://www.secondmarket.com/ [http://perma.cc/3ATN-4C29] 
(“Our online portal allows private companies and funds to customize, control and 
seamlessly execute private securities transactions.”). 
 420. See Morsy, supra note 398, at 1403 (explaining that allowing for a secondary 
market for crowdfunded securities, similar to “Second Market,” is more desirable than a 
resale restriction).  
 421. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e) (2013). 
 422. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249). 
 423. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012). 
 424. Specifically, both provisions were passed by Congress and are not just SEC 
regulations. Also, both the intrastate exemption and the federal crowdsourcing exemption 
would be effectively nullified if securities issued under the intrastate exemption were 
permitted to be resold on national exchanges—permitting states issuers to circumvent the 
federal crowdsourcing regulations by choosing to issue their securities in the state with the 
most favorable laws while also transforming such (initially) intrastate offerings into 
interstate offerings. 
 425. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11). 
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To stymie investor fraud concerns, funding portals offering a 
secondary market feature could impose more stringent requirements 
on issuers and investors. Such requirements might include identity 
verification, heightened education requirements, and heightened 
disclosure requirements on companies seeking to issue tradable 
securities.426  
Additional technological features could also assist issuers and 
investors. For example, Second Market427 permits investors to create 
profiles that include information about their investments and 
“network[s] of ‘trusted’ investors[,]” provides financial news updates 
and “updates on [participants’] investments[,]” and it even offers 
“analyst coverage of certain companies.”428 Likewise, provisions in 
this proposal noted above, including investor education 
requirements429 and social media features that help investors stay 
informed,430 will help promote a viable secondary market. A 
secondary market option certainly is not a perfect alternative to a 
resale restriction. However, by curbing the concerns noted above 
without burdening investors with additional risks, it is a superior 
alternative. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, H.B. 680 was a laudable attempt at a North Carolina 
crowdfunding exemption. North Carolina’s lawmakers should go back 
to the drawing board and draft a bill that minimizes risks to investors 
without overburdening issuers with excessive costs and hurdles. North 
Carolina can provide innovative small businesses and startups with 
access to the capital they desperately need “by exempting offerings 
where the cost of registration clearly exceeds any possible benefits.”431 
The provisions recommended in this proposal achieve that 
balance. First, they limit potential losses to investors while providing 
issuers with sufficient capital to support their startups.432 
Furthermore, standardized, useful, and comprehensible disclosures,433 
 
 426. Cf. Hazen, supra note 179, at 1754 (discussing the need for greater regulation in 
crowdfunding to prevent fraud and investor losses). 
 427. See supra notes 419–20. 
 428. Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 
198–99 (2012). 
 429. See supra Section VI.E. 
 430. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 388, at 181. 
 431. Bradford, supra note 48, at 150. 
 432. See supra Sections VI.A–B. 
 433. See supra Section VI.D. 
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accompanied by the investor education requirements434 provided for 
in this proposal, ensure that disclosures achieve their traditional 
purposes—enabling investors to make fully informed investments, 
while minimizing costs to issuers.435 Moreover, an “all-or-nothing” 
provision maintains checks on issuers by incentivizing them to be 
more responsive to investor concerns and to engage in more diligent 
planning, thus preventing investor losses in undercapitalized 
companies.436 This proposal also promotes competition among 
intermediaries, who are then incentivized to offer issuers premium 
services, to screen issuers, and to offer the best companies on their 
websites.437 Requiring intermediaries to absorb some investor losses 
in the event of fraud will provide a form of fraud insurance to 
investors.438 Finally, loosening H.B. 680’s resale restriction by vesting 
intermediaries with discretion to establish interportal, intrastate 
secondary markets for crowdfunded securities will improve securities 
valuation and improve securities fraud remedies available to 
investors.439 
Of course, a crowdfunding exemption is not meant to prevent 
investor losses in risky startups or ensure a favorable return on 
investment. Nor is there an available model that provides an 
impenetrable shield against fraud.440 Nonetheless, where North 
Carolina is concerned, the uncertainty surrounding equity 
crowdfunding will persist until North Carolina begins its own 
experiment. The North Carolina legislature should “do better”441 and 
prioritize passing its own intrastate equity crowdfunding exemption. 
 
 434. See supra Section VI.E. 
 435. See supra Part II. 
 436. See supra Section VI.C. 
 437. See supra Section VI.F. 
 438. See supra Section VI.F. 
 439. See supra Section VI.G. 
 440. See supra text accompanying notes 179–81. 
 441. Smith, supra note 11. 
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Providing equity crowdfunding to North Carolina entrepreneurs 
can help create economic growth, job creation, and increased 
innovation at minimal cost to taxpayers. Drafting a successful 
crowdfunding exemption will focus on providing effective investor 
protection without overburdening small businesses and risky startups 
with excessive regulation and disclosure requirements. This Comment 
proposes provisions to achieve that balance. 
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